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JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS: MODERNITY,
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Priya S. Gupta*
ABSTRACT
Comparative legal research in property and urban planning law has
taken an increasing interest in the policy patterns and legal arguments
that municipal bodies and courts employ in the implementation of
often radical urban reconfiguration.
Aided by geographers,
sociologists, and political economists, comparative property law
scholars have begun to unearth the justificatory frameworks that
underlie and shape these changes in metropolitan urban landscapes
and that reveal an interplay between tangible and immediate modes
of political constituencies’ interest navigation on the one hand, and
deep-seated cultural-historical motivations as well as commitments to
transnational strategic and political loyalties, on the other. These
modes of research have worked to show how urban ‘local’ decisionmaking is embedded in complex and entangled policy considerations,
which are expressed through the use of economically minded
categories such as progress, modernization, growth, and development.
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The following Article focuses on the case of urban modernization
policies pursued and implemented in one of the world’s largest
metropolitan centers—India’s capital, Delhi—which is also one of the
world’s global cities currently undergoing a radical and breathtaking
transformation. Embarking on a micro-analysis of the justifications
offered in the pursuit of a ‘cleaner,’ more ‘modern,’ and ‘competitive’
metropolis, this Article examines a series of judgments regarding the
rights of urban slum residents. Particularly, the Article applies two
analytical and conceptual lenses in studying the regulatory policies
and the courts’ engagement with them, namely the political economy
of development and the ideational and ideological concepts of
‘modernity’ and ‘neoliberalism.’ The role of the judiciary in the
allocation of property and urban space functions hereby as the site of
engagement, the place where the regulatory fiat is approved or
rejected, reinterpreted and reshaped, endorsed and concretized.
Through this analysis, the Article seeks to provide a richer context for
the way in which a number of key Indian courts, including the Indian
Supreme Court, have become actively involved in regulatory
municipal policies.
The Article highlights and analyzes the
devastating effects of the recent judicial pronouncements for those
constituencies who have long been at the margins and whose legal
protection threatens to be further besieged and mitigated in a largescale shift towards economic liberalization in the name of urban
modernization and the city’s competitive enhancement.
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INTRODUCTION
“O Beautifiers of the City, did you not see that what was beautiful in
Bombay was that it belonged to nobody, and to all? Did you not see
the everyday live-and-let-live miracles thronging its overcrowded
streets?”1

In India, in 2014, one can now access tuberculosis (TB) medicine
from the government at no cost. In some of the poorer areas in the
country’s capital, Delhi, one can even get the complete and directly
observed therapy (DOTS) treatment for TB from the local
convenience store.2 Children can attend school without fees. In
Delhi, if one can afford it, one can avoid the traffic and flooding of

1. SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE MOOR’S LAST SIGH 350–51 (1995).
2. See Our Work, OPERATION ASHA, http://www.opasha.org/our-work/ (last
visited Nov. 19, 2014).
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roads during monsoon season by taking the metro. Polluted tap
water can be filtered to near perfect cleanliness in home filters that
are affordable for the middle class. Medical tourists now come to
Indian cities for much less expensive and ‘world-class’ treatments.
There are fewer cows and monkeys roaming in many parts of Delhi
now.3 There are also fewer peacocks. Karim’s, the famous Mughlai
dhaba (restaurant) founded in 1913 near Jama Masjid in Old Delhi,
has a video on its website that advertises (in English) its “state-of-theart infrastructure,” “well maintained supply chain,” and “extensive
range of products,” as well as a menu that is primarily in Urdu and
Hindi.4
As is now trite to observe, urban areas in India defy neat
classifications, both with regard to the activities that take place there,
and the citizens living in them. And yet, as the examples above
illustrate, there have been some marked changes since the muchdiscussed process of ‘economic liberalization’ began approximately
three decades ago.5 The cited examples, while anecdotal, hint at
changes on the grander scale of things. While a complete picture of
the massive political, economic, and societal transformations taking
place is beyond encapsulation, studying the related phenomena of
urbanization and capitalism can provide insights into the
reconfigurations of everyday lives of citizens and therefore of
society’s understandings of and engagements with larger
undercurrents of change.
The power of these forces—the urban and the capitalistic—in the
Indian imaginary is most clearly observed in the rise of the new
‘middle class’ in India. The new ‘middle class’6 is both imagined in its

3. That said, there are still an abundance of monkeys in some parts of Delhi. See
Sean McLain & Aditi Malhotra, In Delhi, ‘Monkey Wallahs’ Ape Scary Simians to
Spook Pesky Primates, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/forindian-wallahs-monkey-business-has-literal-meaning-1407119401.
4. Company Video, KARIM HOTELS PVT. LTD., http://www.karimhoteldelhi.com/
company-video.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
5. See infra Part II.
6. The term “middle class,” however, is a bit of a misnomer for the reasons
Dasgupta and others have described—the population around whose interests the
Indian economy is being restructured is less than ten percent of the overall
population—making it more elite than the term “middle class” indicates. However,
as he notes, “many of those who [think] of themselves as ‘middle class’ [do] so
because they identif[y] with the hard-working, socially constructive overtones of the
phrase, and because they wish[] to differentiate themselves from another, even
smaller, elite—far richer and more powerful than they . . . .” RANA DASGUPTA,
CAPITAL: THE ERUPTION OF DELHI, at xii (2014). Goldman Sachs, however, places
the income threshold for “middle class” lower, and arrives at a figure closer to fortyfour percent as of 2010. GOLDMAN SACHS, INDIA REVISITED 3–4 (2010),

2014]

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN INDIA

29

conglomeration of lifestyles, wealth, and upward mobility, and real in
its ascension as a demographic. As Goldman Sachs describes it, the
middle class can be described as the emerging class of citizens, who
drives “demand for personal items such as mobile phones, televisions,
personal computers and autos, while also contributing to increased
demand for infrastructure services such as electricity, transportation
and banking.”7 It is defined by this emphasis on consumption—and
in the case of the middle class that resides in cities—consumption
packaged with ideas of technological and urban sophistication.
With this turning of cities towards the middle class and their
lifestyles, where are the urban poor in this sea of change? And, more
literally, where are they in the cities in which they reside? As David
Harvey and others have argued, the growth of urban slums8 is

http://www.goldmansachs.com/gsam/docs/instgeneral/general_materials/whitepaper/i
ndia_revisited.pdf.
7. See GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note 6, at 3–4; see also Vinay Lal, Introduction to
THE OXFORD ANTHOLOGY OF THE MODERN INDIAN CITY: THE CITY IN ITS
PLENTITUDE, at xxix (Vinay Lal ed., 2013) [hereinafter THE OXFORD ANTHOLOGY].
8. Regarding the word ‘slum,’ I would prefer a word with a less negative
connotation, but as ‘slum’ is widely used in policy and law and amongst residences of
such places, I will use it in this Article. As for its definition, I rely on Liza Weinstein
who describes slums as:
[G]enerally substandard settlements in which large segments of the urban
poor live and work throughout the global [S]outh. These settlements are
typically informal, illegal, or quasi-legal and are supported by loose
networks of residents, politicians, community leaders and crime bosses,
social workers, police, and municipal officials.
LIZA WEINSTEIN, THE DURABLE SLUM: DHARAVI AND THE RIGHT TO STAY PUT IN
GLOBALIZING MUMBAI 10 (2014). She also notes that:
Athough the details of their emergence and transformations differ across
political, cultural, and institutional space, slums can be broadly attributed to
failures or gaps in formal service provision. When markets and governments
both fail to provide adequate housing to low-wage workers and their
families, then slums proliferate.
Id. In relation to slums in Delhi, I sometimes refer to them or their units by their
local name (and the name that is used in various court opinions), ‘jhuggi-jhopris,’
abbreviated to ‘jhuggis.’ As Kalyani Menon-Sen and Gautam Bhan describe, slums
cut across different kinds of informal and formal housing. In their work documenting
displacement in Delhi, they use the Government of Delhi typology that includes eight
forms of settlements: jhuggi-jhopri clusters, slum designated areas, unauthorized
colonies, jhuggi-jhopri resettlement clusters, rural villages, regularized colonies,
urban villages, and planned colonies. They note that under the Slum Improvement
and Clearance Act 1956, slums are defined as “areas that are unfit in any respect for
human habitation; and are ‘by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty
arrangements and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangements of
streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of these
factors detrimental to safety, health, or morals.’” Under this definition, “[p]lanning
and legality do not automatically imply the achievement of minimum standards.”
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inseparable from urbanization and capitalism which bring increased
employment opportunities but few spaces for low-wage workers to
live.9 In the case of India, the inhabitants of the slums are often rural
residents who have moved to cities in search of work, which may
include construction work in the growing real estate industry. The
existence of employment, however, does not ensure health or shelter.
As The Hindu, a leading Indian newspaper, recently reported, over
half of Delhi lives in slums, without access to basic services.10 The
contradictions in their lives of increasing access to some human rights
and yet increasing insecurity with respect to their residences represent
yet another challenge to telling a cohesive story of economic
liberalization and societal reconfiguration.
A central contention of this Article is that legal scholars, when
faced with such large-scale constellations of socio-economic change
and regulatory transformation, are prompted to widen their analytical
and conceptual lenses in order to gain an adequate understanding of
how different institutions, including governmental agencies and
courts, operate in the midst of such change. In order to understand
the motivations behind particular policy decisions as well as court
judgments, it becomes necessary to analyze them against the
background of the alluded-to regulatory and political changes. Such
an analysis operates on two levels—the bottom-up study of court
decisions on the one hand, and the encompassing discursive
framework, which comprises official institutional announcements as
well as rhetorical turns, on the other.
In the case of India’s continuing economic and regulatory
transformation11 we find a challenging example of large scale political
transformation that, rhetorically, occurs through recurring references
to the country’s (and its cities’) commitment to seemingly
uncontested ‘values’ of modernity, development, and economic
prosperity and, institutionally, appears to translate into concrete
outcomes and socio-economic redistribution. Studying, in particular,
the way in which Indian courts have authorized the clearance of slum
residences and other forms of precarious occupation, the goal of this
Article becomes one of illuminating—but not overstating—the
KALYANI MENON-SEN & GAUTAM BHAN, SWEPT OFF THE MAP: SURVIVING EVICTION
AND RESETTLEMENT IN DELHI 4 (2008).
9. See infra Part II.
10. 52 Per Cent of Delhi Lives in Slums Without Basic Services, THE HINDU, Dec.
17, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/news/52-per-cent-of-delhi-lives-in-slums-withoutbasic-services/article66507.ece. For an account of these phenomena in Mumbai, see
WEINSTEIN, supra note 8.
11. See infra Part II.
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connections between these judicial endorsements to ‘clean’ city
centers of slums and other forms of delegitimized occupation and the
large-scale, political rhetoric of modernity.
The challenge of
embarking on such analysis lies in the method of placing the court
decisions in question in this larger context without, at the same time,
suggesting or resorting to simple causation patterns. In other words,
the point to be made is not one of a direct causal relationship between
development policy and law, but rather of how the decisive arguments
accepted by the courts must be seen against the background of this
broader context. And so when courts, in justifying slum clearance,
make references to the importance of cities in India, for example,
being ‘clean’ for tourists, or where courts give pride of place to the
‘need’ to build ‘modern’ cities, we will see how they are, in effect,
pronouncing and endorsing the at-the-moment omnipresent rhetoric
of economic modernization and progress.
By drawing closer together this often effusive realm of rhetorical
policy clamor with the much more narrow scope of judicial reasoning,
we will gain a clearer picture of how the marginalization of the urban
poor has occurred through jurisprudence that draws its legitimacy, in
part, from the pervasive discourse of neoliberalism, modernity, and
development.12
The focal points of urban land and its associated laws against their
political-economic background are of particular salience for several
reasons, each of which is further explored in this Article. First,
designations of appropriate urban uses of land are significant
allocations of resources towards residents and users of land—in the
cases explored here, this has meant allocations towards the middle
class and their lifestyles. Second, the construction of cityscapes has
played an important role in the projection of modernity as a
foundational part of national identity, and so understanding Delhi’s
changing landscape is a key part of understanding the wider values at
play in these transformations. Lastly, through land use designations,
the judiciary articulates priorities and values and operationalizes local
governance objectives in ways that are seen to further or impede
development. And so, urban land use is a significant area in which
current development orthodoxy plays out, and the judiciary plays an
important role in how that happens. The study of the forgoing
concepts shows how, since economic liberalization, judgments of the
Supreme Court of India and the Delhi High Court regarding slum
residents have, though not by explicit political statement, furthered

12. Each concept is more fully explained in Parts I and II.
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forms of neoliberal urban development through the decisions that
choose between competing claims to use urban land.
The judicial re-allocations of urban space towards the middle class
in the name of cleanliness, pride, or economic development have
direct impact on the legal status of all rights associated with this
space.
The narrow argument in this Article is that the
disenfranchisement of certain populations from legitimate claims to
cities and city centers is being operationalized legally through shifts in
how urban space and its associated rights are being conceptualized
and justified. Rather than having to justify the new interpretation of
entitlements against legal precedent though, our analysis will show
how rights are being (re-)conceptualized and (re-)configured with
reference to an overarching value justification that exists in political
economic discourses, namely modernity. The broader aim of the
Article, therefore, is to show that legal scholars must engage with
wider discourses—the political economy of development and the
concepts of ‘modernity’ and ‘neoliberalism’—to understand what has
informed the circumstances around which these shifts in judicial
opinion take place. Only by seeing the complex relationships among
these discourses and their global alter-egos can we understand how
they mutually constitute each other and work to exclude the poor
from urban space in an apparently legal manner.
This Article pursues this investigation in four steps. Part I,
concretizes and justifies why the Article develops its analysis of the
tenuous interplay between ‘modernity’ and residential claims from
the perspective of the courts. Part II, in an attempt to sketch the
historical-political context of the case law of interest here, offers a
brief engagement with the concept of modernity in Indian political
and economic thought. The analysis locates modernity’s influence in
the Constitutional framing of property rights, as it has evolved from
the time following Independence (1947) to the (continuing) period of
so-called ‘economic liberalization.’ This loose periodization will
suggest the rhetorically powerful juxtaposition of ‘socialism’13 and (a
neoliberal form of) ‘capitalism’14 as respectively characterizing the

13. There is some debate regarding how to adequately label the particular forms
that socialism took in India. I rely on Pranab Bardhan’s formulation of socialism as
“an economic system with a predominantly public (including co-operative) ownership
of the main means of production and worker control over a large part of the social
surplus.” Pranab Bardhan, Some Reflections on Premature Obituaries of Socialism,
ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 3, 1990, at 259.
14. As explained further in Part II, I argue that the particular form of capitalism
that is in ascendancy in India embodies many of the facets of neoliberalism, as
understood and referenced by the various policymakers and lawmakers in India.

2014]

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN INDIA

33

past and present, as well as the much anticipated (successful)
economic future of India.
Part III shifts our attention to the micro level of analysis and zeroes
in on judicial decisions regarding slum clearances in order to provide
a more detailed account of how courts have repeatedly been able to
justify the eviction and removal of slum residents without, in fact,
overturning any precedent that had associated their ability to stay in
such places to their fundamental rights. The analysis begins with the
seminal Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp.15 decision in 1985, in
which the Supreme Court of India held that the slum and pavement
residents facing displacement had been entitled to procedural due
process under Article 21’s Right to Life.16 As discussed in detail in
this Part, the Court gave significant recognition to the historical and
personal circumstances of those who live in such precarious
residences. Revisiting the decision more closely, the analysis shows
how the Court’s respectful account of the poor and their use of urban
space was reflective of the judges’ acknowledgement of the larger
economic shifts that had occurred and the resulting socio-economic
hardships for some populations. By taking a closer look at the
aftermath and more recent case law, however, the analysis shows not
only how this conception of rights to urban space eventually
narrowed, but also how the language and framing used in the later
cases leave out the sociological and political-economic contexts that
had played a huge role in Olga Tellis.
Finally, Part IV deepens this scrutiny of the case law in question by
revisiting the courts’ language in these cases through the lens of
neoliberal capitalistic development. It argues that the cases provide
implicit and explicit signals to the interests of foreign investors
through the rhetoric of strong property rights, disciplined cities and
citizenry, and beautification of urban areas. This Part also attempts
to draw attention to alternative narratives and judicial articulations of
non-neoliberal ideals that are found in only a minority of case law.
Subsequent courts could draw upon such narratives should they
choose to turn away from the current dominant jurisprudence
regarding urban space.

Throughout this Article, I refer to these terms not assuming that they have precise
meanings, but rather as referential points to the larger political-economic discourses
and values referred to herein.
15. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 3 S.C.C. 545 (India).
16. As explained in Part III, infra, it is not that the case protected their right to
stay absolutely, but rather their right to procedural due process in the case of
clearance.

34

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLII

I. DEBATING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT:
COURTS AS SITES OF ENGAGEMENT
In this Part, we need to answer the question ‘why courts?’ In other
words, this Part attempts to explain and justify how the close scrutiny
of a number of seminal court decisions regarding slum clearance in
Delhi may offer insights into the larger regulatory dynamics in India’s
drive for modernity today. Accordingly, we must begin with the
question, what has been the role of the judiciary in this period of
transition? More accurately, what have been the roles of the various
institutions in the judiciary in these transitions? The main contention
here, however, is that there is no single narrative that could
reasonably and adequately reconcile the different interacting forces
that shape judicial decision-making in this context. Similarly, as we
will see, there is no single narrative that offers a satisfactory
explanation of the fact that India’s courts have, over the last three
decades, provided a range of outcomes with respect to the poor.17
Despite our realization of the impossibility of conceptualizing an
all-encompassing narrative of the role of the Indian judiciary vis-à-vis
the urban poor, we focus on a number of seminal court decisions that
deal with the contested residence claims of slum occupants in Indian
metropolitan centers with attention to Delhi in particular. The
analysis focuses on the situation of the poor in their residential
occupation of urban space and situates it in the contexts of broader
political economy transformations, marked by the pronounced
commitment to the concepts and values of ‘development’ and
‘modernity.’ In doing so, this inquiry engages—through the lens of
the judicial role in urban land use and governance—with two
discourses, one of which revolves around the political economy of
development in India, and the other being driven by concepts of
modernity and neoliberalism in urban development.
This engagement with two complex discourses, each its own world
of concepts, meanings, scholarship, and genealogies, through the lens
of another (the judiciary) is full of risks and needs a particular
justification. A promising answer might be gained when we consider

17. There are seminal cases in the last decade which further the right to health
and other rights for the poor, which stand in intriguing contrast to the cases explored
in this Article, which narrow their rights and decrease their access to resources. See,
e.g., C.E.S.C. Ltd. v. Subhash Chandra Bose, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 573 (India) (regarding
the right to health). See generally YAMINI JAISHANKAR & JEAN DRÈZE, RIGHT TO
FOOD CAMPAIGN, SUPREME COURT ORDERS ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD: A TOOL FOR
ACTION, available at http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/scordersprimer.doc
(regarding the right to food).
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that a legal analysis of case law—especially case law that is marked by
such a high degree of variance as the area here under scrutiny—
remains too internal to legal-institutional reasoning, too tied to claims
of precedent, revision, or turn-around, as long as the context in which
these cases are decided remains in the dark. In other words, an
understanding of how and why courts have, in a growing number of
cases, turned away from a previous recognition of the rights of slum
occupants to reside in the specified urban areas, can only emerge
from acknowledging the operation of courts. This acknowledgment
occurs not only in a larger socio-economic and regulatory context,
but—decisively—in a discursive one. As a consequence, a main
concern of the following analysis is to show that only through a
contextual reading of the cases against the background of an
omnipresent official discourse around the need for the country to
adapt, to move ahead, and to embrace the values of an encompassing
commitment to modernization can we hope to gain a better
understanding of the meanings embedded in judicial rulings that
authorize the clearance of slums. In particular, when judges justify
the (negative) effects on the homeless with references to a ‘modern’
India, or to the city being a ‘showpiece’ to foreigners,18 the challenges
of critically investigating the interaction between large-scale
rhetorical, political discourse and judicial argument become even
more apparent.
Each of these discourses has its own richness that both justifies and
challenges engagement with it.
The political economy of
development offers an important analytical framework to study the
significance of allocations of access to land and property in the Indian
discourses of economic development, as well to the very idea of
democracy in India.19 The arcs that connect a liberal development of
orthodoxy in India with global assertions of the alleged
uncontestedness of the values of economic growth and development
are essential to an appreciation of what has been prioritized and
idealized with regard to the uses of land. India’s continued—if,
varied—experience with and agency in the design of development
policies and priorities must be seen in a relation of mutual
enhancement with global trends in development, a theme touched on
throughout the Article and widely ascertained in the academic

18. See infra Part II.
19. See AKHIL GUPTA, POSTCOLONIAL DEVELOPMENTS: AGRICULTURE IN THE
MAKING OF MODERN INDIA 36–37 (1998) (regarding the importance of modernity
and development to the new post-colonial state).
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literature.20 But, while it should be unsurprising to find that judges—
like other public actors—operate in a discursive context, it is much
more difficult to adequately unpack the concrete ways in which
societal and political discourse shapes or even influences judges’
behavior. To be sure, part of the difficulty stems from the fact that
any assessment of a ‘discourse,’ its main trajectories, and even its
contentions, is itself an assertion of coherence and cohesiveness. As
we discuss in far greater detail in Part II of this Article, nothing could
be further from the truth in the context of modernity discourses.
They are marked by a striking diversity of assumptions as well as
implicit and explicit idea formations regarding the material and ideal
quality, scope, and aspirations of the concept. Precisely because the
idea of modernity escapes all attempts at a simple definition, it
provides for an uncertain canvas on which to map the different stages
of its development.
Modernity’s transformation in India is entwined with the
evolutions of development ideas and policies. Particularly striking is
the use of a periodized history of economic development in the
various scholarly accounts drawn upon here. Against the background
of the preceding observations, it seems even obvious now how the
histories of industrialization and economic liberalization can, at best,
offer moving reference points, as they are told with constantly shifting
reference points, ‘key moments,’ and variances in establishing a
historical timeline. With this in mind, our analysis nevertheless
remains interested in the question of what different and, arguably,
contested accounts of historical-political and socio-economic change
can, at least in part, tell us about concurring changes in urban
development, economic and political redistribution, and urban
transformation. In other words, we must remain interested in an
analysis of urban change ‘in context’—that is, in a study of the
reconfiguration of ways of urban life, through a myriad of regulatory
interventions, which in turn have to be studied against the
background of spatialized domestic and global discourses of the
means and ends of ‘legitimate’ development and global economic
growth.
In an attempt to pick up the echoes and trace the reflections of
these discourses in the intricacy of judicial holdings in cases that

20. See, e.g., ATUL KOHLI, POVERTY AMID PLENTY IN THE NEW INDIA (2012);
LLOYD I. RUDOLPH & SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH, IN PURSUIT OF LAKSHMI: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INDIAN STATE (1987); UNDERSTANDING INDIA’S NEW
POLITICAL ECONOMY: A GREAT TRANSFORMATION? (Sanjay Ruparelia et al. eds.,
2011).
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involve slum clearance, our analysis focuses on references to
‘modernity’ as potential reflections or utterances of an emerging
embrace of neoliberalism on the part of the deciding judges. Both
‘modernity’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are notoriously capacious and
represent shifting amalgams of meanings, and yet both are essential in
any attempt to understand the drive behind India’s official
commitment to development. In the discussion that follows below, no
effort is made to offer neat definitions of these concepts, but rather,
the aim is to illuminate their discursive appearance both in official
governmental language as well as the case law under investigation. In
doing so, the challenge here exists in adequately showing the rich
heterogeneity and multi-disciplinary configurations of these ideas and
how they have impacted the direction of judicial argument in the
context of urban development. What we are interested in, in other
words, is drawing together the government’s often-polemical
references to modernity and neoliberalism, and the engagement of
these terms through the framework of rights, claims, and regulatory
competence in judicial arguments.
Finally, our immediate engagement here with these two discourses
occurs through the lens of the judiciary’s role in urban land use,
zoning, and the regulation of city space. In the discussion of the cases
below, this Article draws attention to the significant urban
constituency living in precarious conditions and offer evidence as to
how a range of different courts have in recent years narrowed the
access of urban poor to space in city centers by ordering the clearance
of slums and the scaling back of rehabilitation for slum residents.
However, the argument is not simply that these courts adopt a
deliberately detrimental position against the poor—rather, it seeks to
understand how the narrowing of these constituencies’ rights and
their increasing marginalization is accomplished and justified. It is
therefore through the very detailed engagement with the case law in
question that we can see the relationships between judicial reasoning
and the discursive dynamics constituted—in part—by the political
economy of development and the argumentative-rhetorical pull of
modernity and neoliberalism. Learning from ‘law in context’ and ‘law
and society’ scholars,21 we are sensitized to the fact that courts
operate in a rich discursive realm of competing interests and
pressures, and our task becomes one of how to unpack and illustrate
these relationships. More specifically, as the Indian courts seek to
21. E.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER
(2007); see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things
Ain’t What They Used to Be”, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365 (2005).
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find a legitimate basis for their decisions in the context of
contemporary urban modernization, this project seeks to further
understand and articulate the dynamics that shape judicial argument,
choices, and outcomes in these processes.
The challenges here are also opportunities to offer a complexified
account: to avoid constructing a conspiracy against the ‘court’ and
instead recognize the multitudes of benches and judges,22 and times
and places, that exist in the judiciary; and, to avoid attempting to
define a direct causal relationship between court action and ideas in
development, and instead articulate how the courts have contributed
to and operated within the development project discursively and
through material allocations of resources.
II. SITUATING MODERNITY AND PROPERTY IN POSTCOLONIAL
URBAN INDIA, BRIEFLY
This Part engages with concepts of modernity in order to sketch the
background against which development discourses in India have
unfolded from the early days of a socialist economy to the more
recent turn towards capitalism. The aim here is not to offer a neatly
periodicized account of distinct stages in India’s economic
development, but rather to see how varyingly implicit or explicit
references to and underlying understandings of modernity can be
traced to have informed and influenced successive discursive stages in
development policy. The insights which we should hope to gain in the
following section concern the employment and appearance of
‘modernity’ as an argumentative and rhetorical device, because it is
here where we might then be able to more clearly discern the
influence of such discourses on the courts’ reasoning.
A. What is Meant by Modernity?
Within the capacious, overarching concept of ‘modernity,’ there is
a particular conception that comes to our attention when Indian
courts use phrases like “building modern India” as a justification for
slum clearance. It is not the ‘modernity’ of modernization theory,
although it links with development discourse and technology; nor is it
some variant of aesthetic modernism,23 though it is at times

22. For more on the structure and diversity of the bench system, see Anjana
Agarwal et al., Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme Court Constitution Benches
Since Independence, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Feb. 26, 2011, at 27.
23. See Jürgen Habermas, Modernity: An Unfinished Project, in HABERMAS AND
THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL
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overdetermined by notions of ‘beautification’ and then appears to
engage space as surface more than as form and function. Modernity,
when used by courts, suggests a folk sense, unexamined in its
provincialism because it does not need to be questioned, and, at the
same time, aspiring to have a global sense, unexamined in its, again,
obvious and self-explanatory universality, or, more critically,
hegemony. Modernity, employed as a justification device, embodies
the sense of a cleaner (Schumpeterian) creative destruction: it can
clear the ground and make room for the new as well as rescue
(selected) parts of the old.24 But it also hangs in the air and yet
dissipates when we try to grasp it: as the Indian economic historian
and social theorist Dipesh Chakrabarty notes, though it might have
“outlived its utility as a rigorous concept and is mostly of rhetorical
value,” it is ubiquitous in everyday discussions of democracy and
development.25 It is a discursive habit as much as a normative goal,
perhaps at times an unthinking mantra, and adaptable to every
aspiration of Indian society, policy, economics, or law. Put another
way, modernity is like what the post-colonial studies scholar, Gayatri
Spivak, said of liberalism, “that which we cannot not want.”26
Insofar as reference to ‘modernity’ or ‘modernization’ can be used
to justify a wide range of policy orientations and societal fantasies, it
is important to begin to at least acknowledge the rhetoric. Such an
acknowledgement has to shy away from an attempt to take on
modernity in all its historical connotations and normative claims.
Instead, we must try to examine its use, and the consequences of its
use, in the language of the judgments that are under investigation
here, especially where the material implications of this rhetoric on the
lives of urban populaces, namely the justification of the removal of
the poor through judicial opinion and urban development, are so
palpable.
The references to the value and significance of ‘modernity’ in India
are reflective of multiple geographies, times, and encounters. In
particular, the Subaltern Studies historians such as Chakrabarty were
instrumental in furthering a deeper understanding of the construction

DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 38–55 (Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves & Seyla Benhabib
eds., 1996).
24. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950).
25. DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, HABITATIONS OF MODERNITY: ESSAYS IN THE WAKE
OF SUBALTERN STUDIES, at xx (2002).
26. For the quote and an insightful discussion and application of it, see Wendy
Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) at 420–21.
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of the term ‘modern’ against the perceived pre-modern.27 While
recognizing the early roots of ‘modernity’ in Enlightenment and the
faith in rationality and institutions,28 they seek to understand its
formulations and uses in India during colonial times and after
Independence. In particular, Chakrabarty, with reference to the
Indian historian Ramachandra Guha, discusses how one primary
difference between the uses of the term in India (as opposed to in the
West) is that modernity in the Indian sense “was not founded on an
assumed death of the peasant.”29 It is this engagement with the
peasant that Subaltern Studies seek to complicate; accordingly, Guha,
Chakrabarty, and others worked to overturn the construction of the
Indian peasant as non- or pre-modern (as contrasted with the
purportedly modern elite nationalist leaders and leading classes).
They highlighted the contradiction that existed at Independence
between the propagation of a modernity that included rights of
citizenship, a market economy, freedom of press, and rule of law, but
that existed, at the same time, alongside domination and
subordination—phenomena which clearly cut against the liberal
principles meant to constitute modernity in the new India.30 This is
the dark side of deeming some populations and some processes
‘modern’—because it rests on the immediate constitution, therefore,
of others as not so. (The very term ‘modern’ necessitates that
division—between new and old, desirable and not—as the term
arguably first came into being for precisely the purpose of making
such divisions.31) The act of making that designation is a clear
“gesture of the powerful”32 and has impacts on the daily lives of
citizens when it is done in a legal setting, whether implicitly or
explicitly.

27. See, e.g., CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at xix.
28. See MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT 3–42 (John Cumming trans., Herder & Herder 1972) (a critical
account).
29. CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at 19 (noting that a peasant did not have to
undergo a “historical mutation” into an industrial worker to become a political
citizen-subject of the nation; the formal granting of rights of citizenship to the Indian
peasant simply recognized the peasant’s already-political nature).
30. See, e.g., id.
31. See Habermas, supra note 23, at 39 (discussing the early history of the word
‘modern’ as used to distinguish between the Christian present and the pagan and
Roman past).
32. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at xix.
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Others have described more pluralistic or alternative versions of
modernity33 or tried to preserve it as a less unilateral, more valueneutral term, arguing that that it was originally meant that way—in
other words, as a ‘way of being,’ which in turn ostensibly could mean
different things to different societies.34 For the purposes of this
Article, our interest in ‘modernity’ emerges from the rhetoricalstrategic place that references to modernity occupy in the court
decisions upholding slum clearances. Our interest, then, is both
analytical and normative. When courts justify actions by claiming
that they are in furtherance of ‘beautifying’ cities, or promoting
certain middle-class ways of life, or when opinions highlight
purported hygiene and morality of poor populations as justifications
for their removal (as opposed to their assistance), the notions of
‘modernity’ are everywhere.35
B. The Right to Property, Modernity, and the Indian Economy
in the Socialist Constitutional Moment and the Decades that
Followed
The goals of economic development and its methods have varied
considerably through the decades: some focus on GDP, others on
poverty, still others on rights, and while some seek to uplift classes of
the population, others focus on enabling the individual to rise. At the
time of Indian Independence, the notion of development that
prevailed was closely entwined with the larger political concept of
modernity and a commitment to socialism. In the Indian sense of
modernity, democracy and development were essential—meaning
that growth itself would have to include the poor. The following
section articulates these ideas further by focusing, in particular, on the
role of property rights.

1.

Modernity in the New Indian Economy

In Sunil Khilnani’s framing of “the idea of India,” he notes that
India as a “creation of the modern world” has been shaped by
“fundamental agencies and ideas of modernity” which he defines as

33. See, e.g., ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
34. See generally JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L. COMAROFF, THEORY FROM THE
SOUTH: OR, HOW EURO-AMERICA IS EVOLVING TOWARD AFRICA (2011).
35. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at xx (discussing how modernity comes
into speech as an expression of moral value, that the rhetoric of the term may be a
sign that it is never far from our thoughts, and arguing that “[w]e must, therefore,
engage and reengage our ideas about modernity in a spirit of constant vigilance”).
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“European colonial expansion, the state, nationalism, democracy,
[and] economic development . . . .”36 And so, modernity as a way of
being for India at Independence, can be seen as a product of many
histories, outlooks, and visions—the political ones being of particular
salience. As Khilnani explains, the bringing together of the vast
diversity of the Indian population and communities into a “single
political community was the wager of India’s modern, educated,
urban elite”—a wager that was based on “the idea of India” that “had
no single, clear definition” but rather accepted pluralistic and diverse
versions of itself.37 Therefore, as both Mahatma Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru had seen, politics was at the heart of India’s
passage to and experience of modernity because the creation of new
India was a creation of a new democracy that would continue that
diversity.38
The new democracy was an unlikely one and against the grain
because of its inequality of caste, its size, and the imperial state from
which it had freed itself.39 The orientation of the ‘nationalist elite’ is
significant—the universal suffrage and the debates in the Constituent
Assembly (responsible for drafting the Constitution) demonstrate the
commitment of the new leaders to bringing the entire population into
the fold of the benefits of Independence.40 The intent was not to
create a domestic version of the colonial structure of elite and
exploitation, but to build an inclusive society, government, and
economy.41
With this mindset at Independence in mind, the close entwinement
of modernity with a commitment to an egalitarian form of economic
development becomes more apparent. As Francine Frankel notes,
modernity in India was seen by political leaders from the time of
Independence to include economic development but also a sense of

36. SUNIL KHILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA 5 (1997). One can also see how closely
‘modernity’ and ‘modernization’ could be here—the version of modernity that
includes politics and economic development, in part informed by European
experiences. That said, in the experience of colonialism and then post-colonial
formation of these ideas, both Europe and India imagined and informed each other’s
outlooks. See generally DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE:
POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000).
37. See KHILNANI, supra note 36, at 5–6.
38. See id. at 9.
39. See id. at 9–10.
40. See generally GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:
A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (2003).
41. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
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morality.42 Morality meant, in part, an awareness of the normatively
undesirable effects of a ‘modern’ society and economy.43 Economic
development, therefore, was conceived as growth with social
welfare.44 This idea, woven into the unique democratic experiment,
meant that growth in and of itself was not the single primary goal of
development, but that elimination of inequality through social
participation in the economy and distribution of its gains were
prioritized.45 Development policies therefore included “ideological
preferences for the establishment of an egalitarian, decentralized, and
cooperative pattern in agriculture and the rapid expansion of public
ownership in the basic industrial sector.”46
That said, these ideas manifested themselves in vague policies that
did not succeed in achieving egalitarian distribution. Evidence of this
failure of political will can be found in agricultural and industrial
reforms, inadequate social welfare expenditure, and the paucity of
poverty alleviation measures.47 The contrast of the ideals of inclusion
and social welfare with the reality of the implementation of
redistributive policies is important, as seen in its influence in the
formulation of property rights in the Constitution described below.48
In official discourse, the agrarian portions of society were seen as
an important part of achieving and governing the process of
development. The rural village, which had played a key part in the
national imagination during the Independence struggle as the site of
Indian identity49 was to become “the primary unit of social
organization.”50 As such, development policies, in theory, were
meant to enable the Indian population to remain committed to
agriculture and small scale (publicly owned) industry, but in a new
way that conceived of villages as the “primary focus of economic and
political development programs” and as part of an entire “social
organism” and “political framework” as opposed to their previous
42. See FRANCINE FRANKEL, INDIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1947–2004: THE
GRADUAL REVOLUTION 13 (2005).
43. In Frankel’s telling, as an indirect result of Gandhi’s continuing focus on what
he saw to be the perils of modern civilization—including excessive consumption,
exploitation of the lower classes, and a profit-driven nature—political leaders were
influenced to see modernity as including a ‘normative dimension.’ See id. at 10–13.
44. See id. at 8; see also KOHLI, supra note 20, at 65; RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, supra
note 20, at 62.
45. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 8.
46. See id. at 18.
47. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 82–85.
48. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
49. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 9–11.
50. See id. at 17. See generally, KHILNANI, supra note 36.
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conception as autonomous units.51 Unfortunately, the government’s
support of agriculture during that time was more rhetoric than reality,
and these conceptions of prosperous villages and productive
agriculture were not to materialize in any significant way.52
One major obstacle on the way to achieve a more egalitarian,
modern Indian agrarian society was that this vision was in direct
tension with existing patterns of ownership. At the time of
Independence, ownership of rural land was heavily concentrated, and
much of the rural population was landless and impoverished. The
newly independent state, then, had to find a way to enable equitable
access to land ownership if it was to fulfill the Constitutional
commitment to “equality of status and of opportunity.”53 However,
this need for more egalitarian ownership conflicted with another
social value at that time—the avoidance of further, violent
revolutionary change. Modernity and development were meant to be
achieved without massive social upheaval.54 Preserving the existing
landholdings of elites had been part of political compromises agreed
on in order to ensure a broad base of support of the Independence
movement and post-Independence policies.55 New leaders could not
attack the entire social hierarchy at once, as it included many of their
supporters who had been necessary during the struggle for
Independence and would continue to be necessary in the midst of the
establishment of a new government.
This meant political
compromises—in particular with regard to property rights—so that
landowners would not feel threatened by the new project of India.56

2.

Modern Property Rights and Land Reform

When the Indian Constitution was written in 1950, the right to
property was formulated similarly to how it is found in other liberal
common law Constitutions, including the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, in that it ensured that property would not
be taken except for a public purpose and with just compensation.57
51. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 17.
52. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 82–83.
53. See INDIA CONST. pmbl.; see also AUSTIN, supra note 40, at 69, 71 (indicating
that many Indian leaders at the time of Independence shared a vision of social
equality and justice).
54. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 20.
55. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
56. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
57. The original protection for property was found in two articles in the
Constitution, Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31. Article 19(1)(f) provided that all
citizens have the right “to acquire, hold and dispose of property.” INDIA CONST. art.
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This right was included in the “fundamental rights” section of the
Constitution. Not only did this constitutional endorsement add moral
and rhetorical force to the legal protection of property rights, but the
placement in the fundamental rights section of the Indian
Constitution meant that claimants could now bring direct suit in the
Supreme Court (without exhausting lower court remedies), having
standing to claim compensation for denial of such rights by the
government.
However, the clash between those in pursuit of egalitarian land
reform and the owning elite’s interests was seemingly unavoidable.
This clash emerged as a tug-of-war between the Supreme Court and
Parliament that lasted for nearly three decades, and manifested itself
in a number of cases involving property.58 Throughout the 1950s, 60s,
and 70s, various land reform laws were passed in state legislatures to
redistribute land towards the landless.59 Elite landowners challenged
these acts before the Supreme Court,60 but judicial review of these
cases was complicated by Parliament’s passage of the First
Amendment in 1951, which limited the scope of judicial review of
certain land reform acts.61 Nevertheless, the land reform acts were

19(1)(f), amended by The Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act 1978.
Article 31 stated that:
(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
(2) No property, movable or immovable . . . , shall be taken possession of
or acquired for public purposes under any law authorizing the taking of such
possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for
the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of
the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in
which, the compensation is to be determined and given.
See INDIA CONST. art. 31, amended by The Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment)
Act 1978.
For a
longer discussion of the debates surrounding the
constitutionalization of the right to property in India, see Priya S. Gupta, The
Peculiar Circumstances of Eminent Domain in India, 49 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 445
(2012).
58. E.g., Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (India);
His Highness Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jiwaji Raoscindia Bahadur v. Union of
India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530 (India); I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2
S.C.R. 762 (India); Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 654
(India); Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 458 (India). For more
on this lineage of cases, see generally Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India
and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1
(2009); see also Mayur Suresh & Siddharth Narrain, Introduction to THE SHIFTING
SCALES OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA 5–8 (Mayur Suresh
& Siddharth Narrain eds., 2014).
59. See AUSTIN, supra note 40, at 67–122.
60. See id. at 90–92.
61. Parliament had amended the property provisions in the Constitution by
inserting Articles 31A and 31B to limit judiciary review of land reform. Article 31A
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repeatedly brought before the Supreme Court, who in 1967 finally
ruled in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab that Parliament could not
amend the Constitution to take away or abridge fundamental rights
(which included the amended version of property at that time).62 In
response, Parliament passed the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth
Constitutional Amendments, which restored its ability to amend any
part of the Constitution and restricted the right to property.63 When
those amendments came before the Supreme Court in 1973 in
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, the Court grappled with how
Parliament could empower itself to change the Constitution in an
unhindered way if it was no longer empowered to change the
fundamental rights section per Golak Nath. It ruled that while
Parliament could amend the Constitution, it could not destroy its
“basic structure,” which included judicial review, democracy,
federalism, secularism, and many of the fundamental rights.64
This battle between the branches was interrupted by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi’s Emergency—the suspension of civil liberties
and general elections from June 1975 to March 1977: an event that
would be a turning point for Indian politics and the role of the
judiciary.65 As Nick Robinson has described, the Emergency
“undercut the political legitimacy of Parliament and the executive, as
well as their claims to constitutional supremacy.”66 As a result, the
Supreme Court was able to “increase its governance role relatively
unchallenged.”67 In apparent atonement for the dictatorial episode
provided that acquisitions of property by the state through law could not be called
into question under the rights to property, equality, freedom of speech, or freedom to
practice one’s profession. INDIA CONST. art. 31A. Article 31B established the Ninth
Schedule, a list of laws outside of judicial review, even under fundamental rights
claims. INDIA CONST. art. 31B. For more on this, see Robinson, supra note 58, at 29;
Suresh & Narrain, supra note 58, at 5.
62. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762 (India). For an insightful
discussion of this case, see Robinson, supra note 58, at 30 (stating “[t]he Court’s
decision in Golak Nath led to widespread outcry from both Parliament and the
public. By placing all of the fundamental rights beyond amendment, the Court had
also placed its more conservative interpretation of the right to property beyond
amendment”).
63. See The Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971; The
Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971; see also Suresh & Narrain, supra
note 58, at 6.
64. Robinson, supra note 58, at 30–31 (citing Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,
A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299 (India)).
65. While a full engagement with Emergency is unfortunately outside the scope of
this paper, readers are directed to see AUSTIN, supra note 40; EMMA TARLO,
UNSETTLING MEMORIES: NARRATIVES OF THE EMERGENCY IN DELHI (2003).
66. Robinson, supra note 58, at 16.
67. Id.
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that the Indian government had imposed on its people, the Indian
judiciary moved towards a rights-based discourse in the 1980s
emblemized in Olga Tellis and its reliance on an expanded
interpretation of the right to life found in Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution.68
Robinson frames the Court’s activism and expansion of the right to
life after the Emergency as follows:
[T]he Court largely justified these interventions [regarding
alleviating poverty] on two grounds. First, it interpreted an active
role for itself under the Constitution’s vision for controlled social
and economic revolution. Second, the Court appealed to principles
of civilization or good governance that necessitated and explained
its interventions.
Through the Court’s right to life jurisprudence, it took on many
details of governance, like ordering more stringent enforcement of
traffic regulations or banning smoking in public places. Indeed, the
Court took on so many functions that its right to life jurisprudence
came to encompass more than just protecting life, but also
promoting good governance more broadly.69

The expansive role of the Court in governance is an important
undercurrent in the slum clearance cases, as we will see. In effect, the
Court has continued its activism and role in governance in many
ways, though now with different sets of values than those embodied in
the post Emergency moment described by Robinson.
After the Emergency, in 1978, a newly elected populist-oriented
Parliament weakened the right to property in order to facilitate these
land reforms.70 The right to property was taken out of the
fundamental rights section of the Constitution and amended to state
merely that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”71 As a result of the amendment, compensation for
takings was no longer guaranteed, and claimants seeking
compensation for government infringement of their property rights
were now forced to base their suits on statutory law72 from 1978
onward.

68. See Suresh & Narrain, supra note 58, at 9–10.
69. Robinson, supra note 58, at 41.
70. This new Parliament had been elected in a move that ousted Indira Gandhi
from office, though she and her party would return less than three years later in 1980.
See AUSTIN, supra note 40, at 483–551.
71. INDIA CONST. art. 300A.
72. Namely, the Land Acquisition Act. See The Land Acquisition Act, No. 1 of
1894, INDIA CODE (1894). This was replaced in 2013 by the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
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It is worth noting at this point that the primary motivation to
weaken the Constitutional right to property—the facilitation of land
reform—was driven by the need to benefit the poor.73 Given the
centrality of agriculture in the Indian economy, the importance of
land reform as a potential method of including the poor in the
economy cannot be underestimated. The political salience of
agriculture was manifested in these reforms as well as other policy
endeavors. Throughout the 1970s, Indian policymakers supported the
‘Green Revolution,’ the new agricultural strategy that included high
yielding seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, electric power, equipment and
irrigation techniques.74
The Constitutional formulation of property rights, the decades of
judicial review of land reforms, and the primacy of development in
national discourse, entwined the politics of the Court with the
governance of resource allocation in ways that continue today. The
next section explores the shifts in the economy towards the form of
neoliberal capitalism that would underlie the shifting jurisprudence
explored in Part III.

3.

Modernity Shifts from Socialism to Capitalism

Unfortunately, the land reforms of the 1970s and 80s failed to
produce the agriculture-led economic growth for which policy makers
had hoped.75 Between 1970 and 1980, the economy grew at an

Resettlement Act, No. 30 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013). Though the land acquisition
process was amended in 2013 to include ideas of consent and increased rehabilitation
for the landless, the new government that took power in 2014 is seeking its
amendment to draw back some of those provisions. See Highways, Tax, Land
Acquisition: A Glance at Narendra Modi’s To-do List on Reforms, HINDUSTAN
TIMES, May 19, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/elections2014/the-big-story/ato-do-list-for-india-s-new-government/article1-1220685.aspx; see also Ketki Angre,
Government Looks to Relax Some Provisions of Land Acquisition Act, NDTV (July
16,
2014),
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/government-looks-to-relax-someprovisions-of-land-acquisition-act-559254.
73. Unfortunately, currently the lack of provision of property in the fundamental
rights section has arguably enabled the government to again redistribute land more
recently—this time from rural citizen to corporation—in the name of ‘development.’
For a more detailed account of this phenomenon, see generally Usha Ramanathan, A
Word on Eminent Domain, in DISPLACED BY DEVELOPMENT: CONFRONTING
MARGINALISATION AND GENDER INJUSTICE 133 (Lyla Mehta ed., 2009); Priya S.
Gupta, The Peculiar Circumstances of Eminent Domain in India, 49 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 445 (2012); Namita Wahi, Land Acquisition, Development, and the Constitution,
SEMINAR MAG., Feb. 2013, at 49; Suresh & Narrain, supra note 58, at 5.
74. FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 581–83.
75. Id. at 581–83.
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average of three percent per year.76 The economy was primarily
based on agriculture and state-led industry in electricity, railways,
communication, machinery, and steel.77 The fruits of this meager
growth were not redistributed effectively through land or other
reforms. The land that was redistributed more often than not went to
the “lower gentry” rather than the daily tiller who remained
landless.78 Without land, much of the population remained below
poverty—in the 1970s “approximately 40 to 50 percent of the rural
population, a minimum of 220 million people, were believed to be
subsisting below the low poverty line,” determined the Indian
Planning Commission.79
With the frustration of failed dirigiste80 policies of the early
decades of Independence and the overwhelming poverty, and the blot
of Emergency behind, policymakers moved India away from socialism
and state-led economic policy gave way to capitalistic policies
throughout the 1980s.81 As Atul Kohli argues, the pro-business turn
began with Indira Gandhi focusing on private industrialists in an
effort to spur growth in the 1980s—a point that is often missed by
scholars.82 She supported business not through extensive Washington
Consensus-type deregulation,83 but rather through an active
government, which included the reform of economic administration
and the orientation of the government towards spending, control of
labor,84 and support of capital.85 This support included the removing
of license restrictions; allowing big business into previously privatized
areas, such as power generation, and offering tax relief.86

76. SADIQ AHMED & ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY, COMM’N ON GROWTH & DEV.,
BATTLES HALF WON: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDIA’S GROWTH AND ECONOMIC
POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE 3 (2008).
77. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 83.
78. See id. at 85.
79. FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 4.
80. State-led development policies.
81. See FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 586–89 (discussing how the turn to marketbased policies was a transition throughout the decade, and not merely the result of
the 1991 reforms); KOHLI, supra note 20, at 92; RUDOLPH & RUDOLPH, supra note 20,
at 25–33.
82. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 31–34.
83. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN
AMERICAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 5 (John Williamson ed.,
1990).
84. Control of labor through legislation meant to discourage strikes and to
encourage cooperation between labor and business. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at
103.
85. See id. at 31–34.
86. See id. at 101–03.
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After Indira Gandhi’s assassination, under her son Rajiv Gandhi,
reforms increased in the second half of the 1980s. Certain industries
were de-licensed, corporate tax rates were lowered, and incentives
were given to the development of technology, in particular the
computer industry.87 State controls on the entry, expansion, and
production of private business were eased.88 Gandhi strove to create
a technocratic image of Congress (his political party) that would be
distanced from the corruption and inefficiency of earlier eras as well
as from socialism.89 According to Kohli, Gandhi had wanted to open
India to trade and investment as part of this “liberalization” but was
unable to do so in a significant way in the face of politically
strengthened domestic business groups.90
This momentum culminated in the 1991 reforms lead by then
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, who implemented significant
reforms of economic liberalization.91 The reforms included a
continuing and increase of the reforms under Rajiv Gandhi, including
increased privatization of state-owned industries, tax concessions, and
deregulation.92 However, the later reforms also included a significant
move towards opening the economy to more international trade and
capital—the currency was devalued, import quotas were dropped,
tariffs came down, and a variety of restrictions on financial
transactions were eased.93 The reforms throughout the 1990s also
included—as Kohli phrases it—”a sharply pro-business” reorientation of industrial policy by further elimination of licensing
requirements, relaxation of antitrust restrictions, and “some efforts to
defang India’s well entrenched and activist labor movement.”94 As

87. See AHMED & VARSHNEY, supra note 76, at 29; see also KOHLI, supra note 20,
at 108.
88. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 106.
89. See id. at 33–35, 107.
90. See id. at 33–35. Starting the narrative of liberalization earlier than the 1991
reforms places them in a slower, more deliberate context. Manmohan Singh was
able, in part, to implement the vast range of reforms that he did because Gandhi had
already moved the country a bit away from the rhetoric of socialism.
91. See AHMED & VARSHNEY, supra note 76, at 30. It is interesting to note that
during the 1991–1992 budget speech where Manmohan Singh announced these
changes, he referred to ‘modern,’ ‘modernization,’ or some form of the word a total
of eight times. See Shri Manmohan Singh, Minister of Fin., Budget 1991–92 Speech
(July 24, 1991), available at http://indiabudget.nic.in/bspeech/bs199192.pdf.
92. See Singh, supra note 91. He had been calling for these reforms well before
the balance of payments crisis that precipitated them. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at
112. The system he implemented had been “developing in his mind since the 1960s,
when he wrote his PhD thesis about foreign trade.” DASGUPTA, supra note 6, at 57.
93. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 12, 112.
94. Id. at 39.
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Kohli goes on to note, these changes were interpreted by the private
sector as “highly favorable to them.”95
As a result of the market-based focus of the reforms described
above, the engines of the economy moved from agriculture and
industry to finance and service. In 1980 agriculture was 38.6% of the
GDP, industry was 24.2%, and service was 37.2%.96 The transition to
capitalism and service is evidenced in the current GDP. While
agriculture and industry still form a considerable bulk of the GDP
(17.4% and 25.8% respectively), service now accounts for 56.9% of
the economy and is growing at a faster rate than both agriculture and
industry.97
The service industry is largely dominated by the
production of urban financial centers and service-oriented
corporations (such as call centers).98
The shift in economic policy and the messages it signaled has
resulted in the rise of private capital as a powerful interest group and
the gradual decrease in power of other interests that were against the
initial reforms.99 After the unfolding of the capitalistic economy over
the past few decades, the change of relationship between the state
and private capital is apparent. The state, as Kohli notes, cannot
“afford to go against the interests of private capital” if they want to
promote economic growth and now “needs to ensure the conditions
95. Id.
96. ARVIND PANAGARIYA, INDIA IN THE 1980S AND 1990S: A TRIUMPH OF
REFORMS tbl.8 (2003), available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/seminars/
2003/newdelhi/pana.pdf.
97. These are 2013 sector totals from the CIA. The World Factbook: India, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/in.html (last updated June 22, 2104) (noting the 2013 sector totals); WORLD
BANK, INDIA AT A GLANCE (2014), available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/
ind_aag.pdf (stating the rate of growth). From 2002–2012, the rate of growth for
agriculture and industry were 3.8% and 8.3% respectively. The World Factbook:
India, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/in.html (last updated June 22, 2104). For service, it was 9.5%.
Id. However, in 2012, agriculture and industry grew at 1.4% and 1%, respectively,
and service grew at 7%. Id.
98. See generally JAIDIT BRAR ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., INDIA’S ECONOMIC
GEOGRAPHY IN 2025: STATES, CLUSTERS AND CITIES 49 tbl.B2 (2014),
http://www.governancenow.com/files/Indias%20economic%20geography%20in%202
025%20States%20clusters%20and%20cities.pdf; RREEF RESEARCH, BUILDING UP
INDIA: OUTLOOK FOR INDIA’S REAL ESTATE MARKETS 14–15 (2006); SHIRISH
SANKHE ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INDIA’S URBAN AWAKENING: BUILDING
INCLUSIVE CITIES, SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH (2010); Uma Kapila, Services in
the Indian Growth Process, in INDIA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1947, at 529
(Uma Kapila ed., 3d ed., 2008); The World Factbook: India, supra note 97.
99. See KOHLI, supra note 20, at 46. For a discussion of the various interest
groups—including within the agricultural and industrial sectors—and their shifting
political and economic powers, see id. at 38–46.
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of the smooth functioning of the private sector” as it is the “main
motor of capital accumulation.”100 A recent publication by the
Ministry of External Affairs illustrates Kohli’s characterization of the
role of government towards capital well. In 2014, the Ministry, in
cooperation with the worldwide consulting firm KPMG, released a
report called India in Business: Preferred Investment Destination that
highlighted not only the growing Indian economy, but the explicit
support of the government in enabling private capital to invest and
the relevant policy changes that have taken place to that effect.101 In
particular, the report notes that the “objective” of India’s foreign
direct investment (FDI) policy is “to invite and encourage FI [foreign
investment] in India.”102 This explicit support can be seen in sharp
contrast to the relatively closed borders just several decades ago. The
issuance of this report, its detailed information, accessible language,
and sophisticated design speak volumes of a government oriented
towards pleasing a global audience of investors. This theme—the
ways in which government has been implicitly and explicitly
supportive of private capital through its policies and its articulation of
values—is picked up again in the analysis of the judiciary in Part IV.
The current form of capitalism that characterizes the Indian
economy can been described as embodying a variety of the features of
“neoliberalism.” While the definition of “neoliberalism” might
appear to be in the eye of the beholder, it is generally accepted that it
is driven by various ideas that favor a focus on the so-called “free
market” over the state in economic growth, free trade, the individual,
strong property rights, and the non-interventionist state, and that it
has been in ascendancy in development policies since the 1970s.103
David Harvey highlights the insidious aspects of this “class project”
by noting that “[m]asked by a lot of rhetoric about individual
freedom, liberty, personal responsibility and the virtues of
privatisation, the free market and free trade,” the project “legitimised

100. Id. at 46.
101. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, GOV’T OF INDIA, INDIA IN BUSINESS:
PREFERRED INVESTMENT DESTINATION (2014). In the introductory letter to the
document, Minister of External Affairs Salman Khurshid states that “[t]he economic
reforms carried out by the government has emphasized on creating an investor
friendly environment which includes opening up foreign direct investment in most
sectors. India is committed to carry forward the economic reforms to ensure the
fulfillment of developmental aspirations of its people.” Id. at e.
102. Id. at 9.
103. See generally Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, Preface to SPACES OF
NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN RESTRUCTURING IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN
EUROPE, at vi (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF
HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005).
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draconian policies designed to restore and consolidate capitalist class
power.”104 While the form of neoliberalism found in India differs in
some degree from other forms of neoliberalism found elsewhere (for
example, in the fact that the State has not entirely receded and that
deregulation has occurred in some but not all areas of the finance and
the economy), the decades following economic liberalization
nevertheless demonstrate significant moves towards many of its
tenets as described above. The salient results of these moves for the
purpose of this project—inequality, urbanization, and the growth of
slums—are discussed below. Another feature, the increase of strong
property rights, is discussed in Part IV.
Unfortunately, while the reforms of economic liberalization have
had a profound effect on the Indian economy in increasing the rates
of growth, they have also increased inequality, as other literature has
discussed at length.105 This has led to a perception that there are “two
Indias, one shining and the other bleak . . . .”106 The dichotomy is
meant to reflect the differences in living standards between the rich
(or, as I would rephrase—middle class) and the poor.107 The
existence of and dynamic between these two Indias plays out in
particularly stark terms in urban settings, where spaces that used to
accommodate a range of Indias are now being designated for the
shining one, as explored in the next Part.
The rise of this “shining” India is, of course, closely aligned with
private capital and urbanization.108 As of 2012, sixty percent of
economic activity was a result of urban residents.109 This has several
implications. First, places of residence have changed from rural to

104. DAVID HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM 10
(Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
105. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 42, at 598–608, KOHLI, supra note 20, at 13–14.
According to Manmohan Singh, who perhaps hoped for too much, the poor would
not be left behind during liberalization. During his 1991–92 budget speech, he
declared that during the period of “transition,” the government would “endeavour to
minimise the burden of adjustment on the poor” and that they were “committed to
adjustment with a human face.” Singh, supra note 91, ¶ 8. But see KOHLI, supra note
20, at 69 (arguing that inclusionary rhetoric decelerated after 1980).
106. AHMED & VARSHNEY, supra note 76, at 2, 36. Note that the word “shining”
was found in the political campaigns of the BJP, the Hindu political party, in 2004 to
capture economic hope. See The Man Behind ‘India Shining’ Slogan, REDIFF.COM
(Apr. 2, 2004), http://www.rediff.com/money/2004/apr/02shining.htm; see also KOHLI,
supra note 20, at 13–14, 64.
107. See AHMED & VARSHNEY, supra note 76, at 2.
108. Regarding the complexities of the relationship between capitalism and
urbanization, see generally David Harvey, The Right to the City, 53 NEW LEFT REV.
23 (2008).
109. KOHLI, supra note 20, at 43.
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urban. Second, places of residence, consumption, and work have to
be built, and real estate has become a significant outlet for domestic
and international capital.110 Third, the middle class is now more
closely associated with business, and has come to see their success as
part of the pro-business story.111
Moreover, the rise of slums is not separate from that of capitalism
and urbanization.112 Tayyab Mahmud has eloquently discussed the
various forces that render slums a product and facilitator of neoliberal
global capitalism. He notes that “urban slums are produced by three
inter-linked and enduring features of capitalism that have been
accentuated by neoliberalism . . . .”113
The first of these is
“accumulation by dispossession,” David Harvey’s concept of how
“markets always rely on non-market forces, particularly legal orders
and extra-legality, to disproportionately allocate power and resources
to owners of capital.”114 This concept, in particular the recognition of
legal orders and the allocation of resources, is important for the
discussion that follows in Parts III and IV. “Accumulation by
dispossession” is strengthened by and produces the second and third
of the features to which Mahmud refers: the existence of a “reserve
army of labor”—the presence of “populations separated from their
non-capitalist means of subsistence but not integrated into the
productive circuits of wage labor on a stable basis”115—and the
“informal sector of the economy”—the places these populations go to
live and work.116 The presence of these factors is massive. As of
2013, as Credit Suisse has calculated, over half of the GDP and ninety

110. See infra Part IV.
111. KOHLI, supra note 20, at 51.
112. See generally DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2003); Tayyab
Mahmud, “Surplus Humanity” and the Margins of Legality: Slums, Slumdogs, and
Accumulation by Dispossession, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2010).
113. Mahmud, supra note 112, at 4–5.
114. Id. at 11 (internal citation omitted).
115. Tayyab Mahmud, Cheaper Than A Slave: Indentured Labor, Colonialism, and
Capitalism, 34 WHITTIER L. REV. 215, 219 (2013). In India, as we will see in the next
Part, such populations consist of displaced rural farmers looking for work who end up
living in urban slums and informal housing.
116. See Mahmud, supra note 112, at 4–5, 17, 24; Sharit K. Bhowmik, A Raw
Deal?, SEMINAR MAG., July 2000, available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/
491/491%20s.k.%20bhowmik.htm (citing HEATHER JOSHI & VIJAY JOSHI, SURPLUS
LABOUR AND THE CITY: A STUDY OF BOMBAY (1974); MUMBAI METRO. REGION
DEV. AUTH., DRAFT PLAN FOR 1995–2005 (1997)); see also Arvind Rajagopal,

Violence of Commodity Aesthetics: Hawkers, Demolition Raids and a New Regime
of Consumption, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Jan. 5, 2002, at 65.
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percent of the total workforce is in the informal sector.117 Focusing
on this inter-dependency of slums and neoliberal capitalism, it
becomes clearer how the existences of “bleak India” within urban
centers are constitutive the story of growth after economic
liberalization.
The first two Parts of this Article have discussed the theoretical
engagements of the judiciary with economic forces (Part I), and then
the transformation of the economy to a capitalistic, urbanized one
(Part II). We can now return to the judiciary—this time to study it as
the specific site of articulation of values that reflect and reshape city
spaces through the analysis of slum clearance cases, before exploring
the neoliberal development of cities around these values.
III. URBANISM, THE EMERGENT MIDDLE CLASS, AND THE SLUM
RESIDENT IN CASE LAW
With the transitions described above—towards capitalism, an
increasingly service-based economy, and cities as the places of
economic productivity—the setting of popular imaginaries of India
seems to have moved as well from the rural to the urban.118 This can
be observed in fiction,119 narrative nonfiction,120 and film121 in their
attempts to capture the spectacle of the urban with increasing
fascination and detail. Cities are revealing places to locate the
current ways of being, the current versions of modernity in India.
They are the places where the varied activities in any particular space
are negotiated, accommodated, claimed, and re-claimed not just daily,
but moment by moment. A sidewalk may simultaneously serve as a
117. NEELKANTH MISHRA & RAVI SHANKAR, CREDIT SUISSE, INDIA’S BETTER
HALF: THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 1 (2013), available at https://www.credit-suisse.com/
newsletter/doc/apac/aic2013/20130712_indiamkt.pdf; cf. Bhowmik, supra note 116
(citing JOSHI & JOSHI, supra note 116) (reporting that in 1961, sixty-five percent of
Mumbai’s economy was employed in the formal sector and the remainder in the
informal, with those proportions being reversed thirty years later).
118. SANKHE ET AL., supra note 98, at 37 (noting that urbanization is occurring at a
stunning pace in India—as much as thirty percent of the population resided in cities
as of 2010, and forty percent is expected to by 2030).
119. For example, see the 2008 Booker Prize-winning novel, ARAVIND ADIGA,
THE WHITE TIGER (2008).
120. E.g., KATHERINE BOO, BEHIND THE BEAUTIFUL FOREVERS (2012);
DASGUPTA, supra note 6; SONIA FALEIRO, BEAUTIFUL THING: INSIDE THE SECRET
WORLD OF BOMBAY’S DANCE BARS (2010); SUKETU MEHTA, MAXIMUM CITY:
BOMBAY LOST AND FOUND (2004); AMAN SETHI, A FREE MAN (2011).
121. E.g., SLUMDOG MILLIONAIRE (Warner Brothers 2008). A variety of recent
Bollywood films relish scenes of a gritty urban life. E.g., DEV D. (Anurag Kashyap
Films 2009). But see PEEPLI LIVE (Aamir Khan Productions 2010) (a widely seen
depiction of rural life).
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place to work, a place to sell things, a place to walk, a place to eat, or
a place to rest. This multiplicity of users and uses is exactly what is at
risk when values such as certainty and formality become more
powerful than those forces that previously tempered it—diversity and
accommodation—and are sought to be codified in spatial structures,
lifestyles, and the law. In short, city spaces are where Indian
democracy most dramatically plays out in ways that stretch and test
the Indian versions of modernity and inclusion, and force it to
prioritize the sharing of resources or the certainty of formality. They
are “dramatic scenes of Indian democracy: places where the idea of
India is being disputed and defined anew.”122
In these scenes of democracy, the judiciary plays various leading
roles. Through the history of development, the formulation of
property rights by the judiciary has worked to allocate resources
towards certain groups. In the cases that follow, once again disputes
as to the rights of citizens to use space come before the courts. In
these cases, the judiciary has to decide between competing claims of
use and entitlement. These claims are brought by a variety of
claimants: NGOs and activists on behalf of slum residents,123 an
environmental activist for waste management in Delhi, and residents
nearby a slum. In the courts’ implicit and explicit valuation of these
claims, they redefine who has a legitimate claim to which space, and
they show us how the judiciary continues to have a powerful influence
on resources and the economy.
This exploration reveals support for lifestyles of the new middle
class as an underlying motif in these cases. The ways of life alluded to
in them are significant facets of the new modernity which, as we
explore in the next Part, is characterized by disciplined and clean
citizens and cities welcoming international capital and real estate
investment. Such investment directly sustains these lifestyles through
the construction of high-end residences, corporate office towers, and
new malls and shopping centers.124

122. KHILNANI, supra note 36, at 109.
123. These claims are brought through a process called “Public Interest Litigation”
(PIL) where the locus standi requirements are reduced for cases involving right to life
claims under Article 21. With this softening of standing, “any public spirited citizen
[can] move the courts on behalf of a person or persons who may not have the social
or financial capacity to move the courts themselves.” Prashant Bhushan, Supreme
Court and PIL: Changing Perspectives Under Liberalisation, ECON. & POL. WKLY.,
May 1, 2004, at 1770 [hereinafter Bhushan, Supreme Court]; see also Prashant
Bhushan, Misplaced Priorities and Class Bias of the Judiciary, ECON. & POL. WKLY.,
Apr. 4, 2009, at 32 [hereinafter Bhushan, Misplaced Priorities].
124. See SANKHE ET AL., supra note 98, passim.
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Through their decisions, courts do more than apply law and decide
cases, or even choose between claimants, rights, and their perceived
interests. Through their use of language, their framing of rights and
narratives, holdings, and rulings, they can be seen as aiding in the
construction of particularly legalized, but also—through the
normative reference to the values of modernity which are portrayed
as being at stake in these concrete cases—legitimized, urban uses of
space. But, the courts’ agency in constructing normativity goes
beyond that because the rights of the individuals caught up in these
decisions themselves become a matter of judicial intervention and
construction. When courts endorse the governing body’s rendering of
a ‘modernist’ use of land, for example, they simultaneously legitimize
particular ways of life and, by consequence, the subject associated
with those lifestyles. And so, a close look at land use jurisprudence
reveals the legal processes through which other populations get
dropped through the cracks of the economic structural shifts explored
in Part II by being (implicitly) designated as outside of the project of
modernity.
From the recognition of the right to life of slum and pavement
residents in Olga Tellis to the more recent cases which declared that
such residents should have no rights to rehabilitation, the cases in this
trajectory illustrate the shift in legitimacy regarding the use of urban
space. This Part situates this transition within these cases—in order
to understand how slum residents are being further disenfranchised
through legal discourse, and how deeply embedded such justifications
are in the most recent formulations of modernity in legal, political,
and economic discourse in India.
A. Olga Tellis and the Narrative of History, Circumstances, and
a Respect for Pluralistic Contributions to Urban Life
The foundational case of modern treatment of slum residents is
Olga Tellis, a Supreme Court case from 1985 in which pavement and
slum residents in Bombay brought suit against the state and local
government for their plans to remove them.125 They alleged, inter
alia, that (1) the government removal of pavement and slum residents
violated their right to life (enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution) by precluding access to their ability to earn livelihood,
and (2) this removal would also violate a property claim regarding a
right to occupy public land.126 The government claimed that the

125. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 3 S.C.C. 545 (India).
126. Id. ¶ 2.
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residents did not have any rights to trespass public land and prevent
free movement of pedestrians on sidewalks.127
On the first claim, the Supreme Court found in favor of the
pavement and slum residents, with certain qualifications. They set
certain conditions for the removal of slums sympathetic to slum
residents, including that slums which had been in existence for more
than twenty years and which had been “improved and developed”
would not be removed unless the land on which they stand or the
appurtenant land was required for public purposes, in which case,
alternate sites or accommodation would be provided.128
Regarding the second argument, that slum residents had a right to
be on public property, the Court did not find for the residents, and
stated that “no person has the right to encroach . . . on footpaths,
pavements or any other person reserved or earmarked for a public
purpose.”129 The language is unequivocal and indicated that such a
person “becomes a trespasser.”130
While Olga Tellis is groundbreaking, and a high point for those
who are forced to live on pavement and in slums, it merits still further
exploration, given the trajectories that have followed from it. It is
true that the Court’s ruling is more accommodating of the rights of
pavement and slum residents than what might have been expected.
The argument here, however, is that the significance of the decision
lies in large part with the way that pavement and slum residents are
respected as citizens and individuals (to some extent) and how
legitimate uses of space are constructed. Moreover, as explained
below, the qualifications131 to the provision of alternative sites of
residence left the law open for later reinterpretation and narrowing.
Three narrative threads in the case reflect the Court’s recognition
of the ways in which these populations were being left out of the
benefits of development, while bearing the brunt of shifts in the
economy as it moves towards privatized industrialization and service.
These narrative themes are: (1) the historical and economic
circumstances of their marginalization, (2) their intent to reside where
they do, and (3) their contributions to urban life. This respect for
127. Id. ¶ 11.
128. Id. ¶ 57.
129. Id.
130. Id. ¶ 43. Note the mention of ‘necessity,’ but petitioners arguing for the
higher ideal that property is meant to subserve the common good, questioning the
function of property in a welfare state. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
131. The court does rule for rehabilitation in this case, but it qualifies this by
reiterating many times that this ruling does not require rehabilitation as a
prerequisite for removal. Id. ¶¶ 37–46.
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their agency and the recognition of the role of the state and market in
creating these circumstances and constraints on their ability to live
with dignity all but disappear in the later opinions discussed below.

1.

History of Displacement

An acknowledgement of how slum residents ended up in their
living situations permeated the opinion and drove the ruling.
Bombay and Delhi (like many other cities) do not have public or low
cost housing. Though such housing is provided for in various city
plans, there has been no significant implementation of these
provisions.132 The residents who live in slums and on pavements are
often displaced rural populations who moved to the cities for better
employment opportunities as the primary engines of the economy
moved from rural to urban settings. The common sequence of events
which led to these slum residents living on the outskirts of legality was
recognized in Olga Tellis:
[O]ne of the main reasons of the emergence and growth of squattersettlements in big Metropolitan cities like Bombay, is the availability
of job opportunities which are lacking in the rural sector. The
undisputed fact that even after eviction, the squatters return to the
cities affords proof of that position . . . . These facts constitute
empirical evidence to justify the conclusion that persons in the
position of petitioners live in slums and on pavements because they
have small jobs to nurse in the city and there is nowhere else to live.
Evidently they choose a pavement or slum in the vicinity of their
place of work, the time otherwise taken in commuting and its cost
being forbidding for their slender means.133

Once these residents find themselves in slums and pavements, they
often are subject to cycles of demolition and displacement in the
name of development or, more recently, beautification.
Rehabilitation and relocation for these residents is spotty and rarely
delivered, if promised at all.134 This history of the economic shifts
recognized here (and explored above in Part II) is relevant to
understanding the limited choices of poor urban populations with
respect to employment and residence. This history is lost in

132. See, e.g., DELHI DEV. AUTH., CENT. GOV’T, MASTER PLAN FOR DELHI 6
(1962) [hereinafter 1962 MASTER PLAN] (detailing how housing for low income
residents and low income migrants must be built and made available to them); see
also DELHI DEV. AUTH., CENT. GOV’T, MASTER PLAN FOR DELHI 12–15 (1990)
(discussing various schemes to improve the housing shortage for low income people).
133. Olga Tellis, (1985) 3 S.C.C. ¶ 36.
134. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
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subsequent cases when the recognition of the context of how and why
residents live on the streets or on other public land does not appear to
be a factor in the courts’ decisions. Once this history is not
acknowledged, the logic of accommodation of their circumstances
falls away. Slum residences appear to be trespassers, occupying urban
spaces for no clear reason except opportunism, and are then deemed
undeserving of minimum welfare provisions.

2.

Intent and Circumstance

After recognizing the prevalence of rural unemployment which
compels many to move to the cities, the Court recognized that the
petitioners had not intended to “‘commit an offence or intimidate or
annoy any person,’ which is the gist of the offence of criminal trespass
under Section 441 of the Penal Code.”135 Instead, the Court observed
that:
They manage to find a habitat in places which are mostly filthy or
marshy, out of sheer helplessness. It is not as if they have a free

choice to exercise as to whether to commit an encroachment and if
so, where. The encroachment committed by these persons are
involuntary acts in the sense that they are not guided by choice.136
By disavowing the petitioners of ‘intent’ to encroach, the Court
prevents them from being found in criminal trespass. This lack of
criminalization is significant. It rests on an understanding of how and
why these populations are living on land that is not legally theirs to
possess. Moreover, it respects the resilience of the marginalized to
survive through their own hard work and determination. Living on
pavement is not an ideal circumstance, nor is it conducive to a life
with emotional or physical security or health. And yet, these
populations survive in such situations, and the Court, in avoiding
criminalization, refrains from further de-humanizing them and their
existences. It is only through the recognition of the history and
structural economic conditions that this characterization of a lack of
intention to offend appears to be a natural conclusion. And, when
such history is left behind in subsequent opinions, the door is left
open for criminalization, or at least illegitimacy, to reappear.

135. Olga Tellis, (1985) 3 S.C.C. ¶ 49.
136. Id. (emphasis added).
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Recognition of Individuality and Contributions of this
Population to Urban Life

The Court also articulates respect for these citizens by building a
record of facts based on their very high employment figures and
skills.137 They also refer to several individuals, including a college
This recognition of individuals both
graduate and a poet.138
humanizes and builds respect for the agency of these populations in
the audience—be it a legal or popular one. These are not masses of
indistinguishable poor, at least according to parts of the opinion.139
That said, though, the valuation is primarily justified based on
economic considerations regarding this population’s productivity,
without regard to the communities they have formed which eviction
would disrupt or their value simply as human beings. In later
opinions and in later times, the citizen-agent of economic productivity
is no longer the general working citizen, but rather the urban middle
class consumer. As explained further in Part IV, once this shift
happens, the slum resident is no longer seen as economically
productive (despite their actual employment), and is considered to be
a drag on the modern economy and beautified city.
B.

Olga Tellis’ Progeny Post Economic Liberalization

Various cases interpreted Olga Tellis first faithfully140 and then
increasingly narrowly, with fewer allowances of rehabilitation for the
pavement or slum residents.141 This section explores three cases since
economic liberalization that narrowed the abilities of the urban poor
to stay in their residences or access alternative ones and the rhetoric
used by courts in justifying this. Reading later cases, the declining
legacy of Olga Tellis becomes more apparent: these cases rely on each
other and not on Olga Tellis in their endorsement of the attitude
adopted towards the urban populations. These opinions weave an
account of the circumstances of populations that is tied up with
conceptions of morality, hygiene, and modernity. The impact that

137. Id. ¶ 50.
138. Id.
139. E.g., id.
140. See, e.g., Ahmedabad Mun. Corp. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, A.I.R. 1997
S.C. 152; Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051 (India); Shantistar
Builders v. Narayan K. Totame, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 630 (India); see also Jayna Kothari,
A Right to Housing?, INDIA TOGETHER (Apr. 2002), available at
http://indiatogether.org/opinions/rhousing02.htm.
141. See Kothari, supra note 140; Usha Ramanathan, Illegality and the Urban
Poor, ECON. & POL. WKLY., July 22, 2006, at 3193.
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this use of precedent has had on the rights position of the affected
population could not have been more stark: not only did the change
in the law lead to an illegalization142 of these populations’ existences
in their accustomed-to urban spaces, but the characterization of these
places in particularly conceptualized urban societies (both physical
and existential) through specific language and historical framing
made these legal shifts appear natural and desirable.
The historical and socio-economic contexts of how these
populations ended up in the slums that Olga Tellis acknowledged—
rural displacement and a need for employment—is not recognized in
these cases.143 That history, if it had been told, might have included
not only how these populations ended up in the spaces in which they
resided, but also how the nature of the patronage-style relationship
between elites and slum residents had changed in such a way that
meant less accommodation and provision for the poor.144 The loss of
recognition of the structural constraints of development is also
indicative of a turn from analysis that acknowledges the past
(displacement, employment, migration) to analysis that aspires
towards a particular future. In other words, the later cases are not
without a temporal context—it is just that the direction of that
temporality has changed. The opinions no longer look back to what
has happened to populations and land; they look forward to a modern
future, and in doing so, draw out aspirations as to how a city (and
citizens) should look in that time.
Each of the three factors above—individuality, intent, and
history—are discussed in the cases that follow. The analysis below
highlights how each of these cases is useful for revealing the loss of a
particular factor: Almitra Patel145 for the loss of individuality and
contribution; Pitam Pura146 for the loss of intent; and Okhla Factory
Owners147 for the loss of history.
142. See Ramanathan, supra note 141, at 3195–97 (describing the increasing
illegalization of the poor through the post-2000 Delhi cases involving slum residents).
143. For an account of how many of the slum residents in Delhi came to live where
they do, see Lalit Batra & Diya Mehra, Slum Demolitions and Production of Neoliberal Space: Delhi, in INSIDE THE TRANSFORMING URBAN ASIA: PROCESSES,
POLICIES AND PUBLIC ACTIONS 391 (Darshini Mahadevia ed., 2008).
144. See generally Partha Chatterjee, Are Indian Cities Becoming Bourgeois at
Last?, in BODY.CITY: SITING CONTEMPORARY CULTURE IN INDIA 171–85 (Indira
Chandrasekhar & Peter C. Seel eds., 2003).
145. Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 679 (India).
146. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393 (Delhi
H.C.).
147. Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi,
(2002) 108 D.L.T. 517 (Delhi H.C.).
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Almitra Patel, or the Loss of Individuality

In 2000, after economic liberalization, the Supreme Court heard

Almitra Patel v. Union of India, a case that would have large
implications for slum and pavement residents.148 To understand the
significance of this case in shifting the legality of residence, it must be
studied both structurally: who the parties were, what the legal issue
was, and what the ruling encompassed; as well as rhetorically and
contextually: what the Court said in the written opinion and how they
said it, what they did not say, and what the socio-economic conditions
in Delhi were at the time. Almitra Patel, an environmental activist,
brought the case against the city of Delhi regarding the issue of waste
management.149 Though the actual legal issue was Delhi’s failure to
institute an effective waste management system, the Supreme Court,
in the course of its analysis, drew slum populations into the scope of
the situation in several ways, as explained below. By the time they
issued the ruling on sanitation and eradication of slums (discussed
below), it appeared like a logical answer to the problems as they had
been framed.
The case is actually a consequence of the Court’s decision to review
a number of directives it had issued several years before.150 Part of
those directives included orders that certain cities would undertake
comprehensive implementation of sanitation measures.151 Almitra
Patel is where the Supreme Court and Delhi face off regarding the
apparent noncompliance with this directive—in short, why the Delhi
government has not been effective at “keeping the city clean.”152
The Court begins by lamenting the fact that the “historic city” of
Delhi is now “one of the most polluted cities in the world.”153 It
discusses in detail the orders given to clean up which have not been
followed, and the massive pollution, in particular with regards to solid
waste.154 Through the process of holding the Delhi government
accountable for the ‘unclean’ state of the city, the court explores why
the Delhi government has failed in this regard. In the course of this
148. Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. 679.
149. This case was brought as Public Interest Litigation (PIL), which allows for
flexibility regarding standing. See id. For an explanation of PIL and an argument
regarding its trends, see generally VARUN GAURI, WORLD BANK, PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION IN INDIA: OVERREACHING OR UNDERACHIEVING? (2009), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5109.
150. Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. ¶¶ 1–2.
151. Id. ¶¶ 1–3.
152. Id. ¶¶ 6–9.
153. Id. ¶ 1 (quoting Wadhera v. Union of India, (1996) 3 S.C.R. 80 (India)).
154. Id. ¶ 3.
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explanation, the court draws slum populations into the ambit of
blame for the massive pollution of the entire city.155 This results in a
double condemnation of slum populations: first, for not being good
workers or cleaning Delhi effectively; and second, for living on public
land. Each point is explored in turn below.
In the Court’s account, the Delhi government’s ineffectiveness at
alleviating or preventing pollution can be traced to its ineffectiveness
in managing its own sanitation workforce: “[t]olerating filth, while not
taking action against the lethargic and inefficient workforce for fear
of annoying them, is un-understandable and impermissible.”156 The
opinion does not explore in detail who this “lethargic and inefficient
workforce” is.
It is possible that the Court meant middlemanagement of the Delhi government. That reading, however, is
unlikely, as the Court also says that one of the local agencies alone
employs approximately 40,000 people as ‘safai karamcharis’
(sanitation workers, as explained further below) who are expected to
work for eight hours a day and that, as noted by amicus curiae, “the
[unsanitary] conditions of different areas of Delhi does not in any way
show that the requisite effort has been put in or the required time
spent in cleaning operations which are supposed to be carried out by
this large workforce” 157—observations which are clearly directed at
the lowest workers, not the management. Given the uncritical
referral of the amicus brief, it appears when the Court refers to
lethargy and inefficiency, the court means the actual workers—who
are, in the unacknowledged reality, making their living in incredibly
harsh and unsafe conditions.
Despite characterizing them as part of the root of the problem, the
Court leaves unexplained who these safai karamchari workers are.
‘Safai karamchari’ means, literally, ‘cleanliness worker’ and generally
refers to people engaged with the most hazardous and polluted
sanitation tasks. The term includes (but is not limited to) those
engaged with ‘manual scavenging’—the practice of cleaning out dry
latrines and sewage by hand. These workers – some of whom are
regularized (i.e., receive benefits from their employers) and many of
whom are not (daily wage earners or contract labor)—are some of the
most marginalized populations in the country. They overwhelmingly
come from lower castes communities and most of them are female.
There have been numerous efforts (including from public authorities)
155. Id. ¶¶ 7–9.
156. Id. ¶ 12. Moreover, characterizing the poor as an ineffective workforce puts
them in tension with the ideals of a capitalist form of modernity. See infra Part IV.
157. Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. ¶ 8.
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to document their inhumane treatment and to improve their
conditions, but despite later legislation and cases in their favor, the
employment of people to do such work remains a widespread and
terrible problem.158
In the Court’s account of why Delhi is not clean, not only are these
workers drawn into the narrative for failing to do their jobs, but the
slum areas where workers such as these often live are brought in as
well. This is a second condemnation of these populations—the Court
first conflates them with land mafia:
Large areas of public land, in this way, are usurped for private use
free of cost. It is difficult to believe that this can happen in the
capital of the country without passive or active connivance of the
land owning agencies and/or the municipal authorities. The promise
of free land, at the taxpayers’ cost, in place of a jhuggi,159 is a
proposal which attracts more land grabbers.
Rewarding an
encroacher on public land with free alternate site is like giving a
reward to a pickpocket . . . . [M]ore and more slums are coming into
existence. Instead of ‘Slum Clearance’ there is ‘Slum Creation’ in
Delhi. 160

and then subsequently blames them for the increase in garbage and
waste in the entire city:
This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land
in and around the slums. This can best be controlled at least, in the
first instance, by preventing the growth of slums . . . . It is the

158. For more on their situation and the attempts to eradicate this work, see Safai
Karamchari Andolan v. Union Of India, (2014) WP(C) No. 583, ¶ 2 (India), available
at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/6155772/; Delhi Jal Bd. v. NCDRSAW, (2011) Civ.
App. No. 5322, ¶ 10 (India), available at http://www.hrln.org/hrln/dalit-rights/pils-acases/678-delhi-jal-board-versus-national-campaign-for-dignity-and-rights-ofsewerage-and-allied-workers-a-others.html; SARITA BHOI, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
NETWORK, DIGNITY AND RIGHTS OF THE SEWERAGE AND ALLIED WORKERS 6
(2011), available at http://hrln.org/hrln/dalit-rights/reports/735-book-released-dignityand-rights-of-the-sewerage-and-allied-workers.html; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SUBMISSION TO THE CEDAW COMMITTEE: CONSIDERATION OF INDIA’S PERIODIC
REPORT 58TH SESSION (2014), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
related_material/HRW%20submission%20to%20the%20Committee%20%20CEDAW%20India%20-%20June%202014.pdf
(discussing
rural
manual
scavenging); Saasha Malpani, Supreme Court Judgment Striving to Fully Eradicate
Manual Scavenging in India: Another Attempt in Vain?, J. INDIAN LAW & SOC’Y
(July
14,
2014),
http://jilsblognujs.wordpress.com/2014/07/14/supreme-courtjudgement-striving-to-fully-eradicate-manual-scavenging-in-india-another-attemptin-vain/.
159. ‘Jhuggi’ is a term used in Indian discourse and by Indian courts to refer to
slums. As such, it is used in this Article with reference to the judgments.
160. Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. ¶ 14; see also Usha Ramanathan, Demolition Drive,
ECON. & POL. WKLY., July 2, 2005, at 2908.
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garbage and solid waste generated by these slums which require to
be dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of priority.161

In condemning the Delhi government, the Supreme Court
condemns, even more harshly, the people whom they see as the
beneficiaries of Delhi’s failures to protect public property. The Court
does not distinguish between those who profit from slums and those
who end up residing there, despite the lack of options they face for
housing. The Court refers to slums as ‘good business’ for the land
mafia who run them, but then uses this minority of people who
benefit from opportunistic squatting and illegal rent to characterize
entire populations in this way. They do not tell the full story of slums
with recognition of the many others who live in slums because of little
alternative, and who are beholden to such slumlords as the only way
of having a physical place to reside in the city.
Telling the narrative in a way that causally connects these
populations (in a de-individualized way) to the problem of waste and
undeserving profiteering is powerful. From there, the Court puts the
first wedge between slum residents and rehabilitation. The statement,
“[r]ewarding an encroacher on public land with free alternate site is
like giving a reward to a pickpocket,” has been cited in numerous
subsequent cases and in the news.162 This declaration, despite being
out of context given the narrow legal issue in the case, arrives after
the narrative is presented, and is asserted uncritically and in apparent
solution to the problem at hand.
The Court might have issued a narrow opinion regarding an
empirical analysis of the specific order and what measures Delhi
government did take regarding sanitation and had not been
implemented effectively. However, it goes much beyond this and
paints a clear picture of the dire situation—by narrating the Delhi
government to be nearly completely ineffectual and the slum
residents to be unjustly benefiting from, and polluting through the use

161. Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. ¶ 14.
162. E.g., id.; A.A.Das v. Mohanty, (2014) WP(C) No. 11585, ¶ 8 (Orissa H.C.),
available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/24175965/; Jagjit Singh v. Union of India
(2010) WP(C) No. 2806-2934/2004, ¶ 21 (Delhi H.C.); Wazirpur Bartan Nirmata
Sangh v. Union of India, (2003) 103 D.L.T. 654 (Delhi H.C.), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1927946/; Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l
Capital Territory of Delhi, (2002) 108 D.L.T. 517 (Delhi H.C.); Tripti Lahiri, The
Ground Beneath Our Feet, TEHELKA MAG. (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.tehelka.com/
the-ground-beneath-our-feet/?singlepage=1; Encroachments Cleared to Make Way
for Drain, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS (May 25, 2014), http://www.newindianexpress.com/
states/odisha/Encroachments-Cleared-to-Make-Way-for-Drain/2014/05/25/
article2244541.ece.
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of, space that is not theirs to use.163 Despite the fact that these slum
populations (and their conditional right to rehabilitation) was not the
issue of the case, the right to rehabilitation gets chipped away by the
time the opinion is done.
After this exposition regarding how migrants and slums are at fault,
the Court ultimately directs the Delhi government to ensure that new
“encroachments” are not created and that existing ones should be
improved with regard to sanitation until they can be removed,164 to
create adequate compost plants, and to appoint adequate numbers of
magistrates to enforce laws in relation to litter, nuisance, sanitation,
and public health.165 The case effectively intertwines issues of
sanitation, slum populations, and law enforcement in the legal
imagination—a combination which would then underlie later cases
and rulings.

2.

Pitam Pura, or the Loss of Recognition of Circumstance

Two years later, the Delhi High Court heard Pitam Pura Sudhar
Samiti v. Union of India—the next case that moved urban slum
populations even further away from occupying spaces in the city or
even from rehabilitation on its edges. In Pitam Pura, in keeping with
common practice, the Delhi High Court combined multiple petitions
with similar legal issues and issued an opinion meant to apply to all of
them.166 The various petitions came with two sets of arguments and
stances—the first, from residents of middle class colonies nearby to
slums seeking eradication of slums, and the second, from residents of
slums seeking government provisions or rehabilitation.

163. Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. ¶ 14.
164. Id. ¶ 21.
165. It should be noted, however, that according to some, the case is also what led
to “Municipal Solid Waste Management Rules”—perhaps a bright moment, though
the implementation of such rules remains scant. Asha Sridhar, A Woman’s Battle to
Keep Waste from Ending Up in Landfills, THE HINDU, Aug. 15, 2013,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/chennai/a-womans-battle-to-keep-waste-fromending-up-in-landfills/article5023257.ece. It should also be noted that, from a read of
her website, the activist Almitra Patel who brought the case for the purpose of waste
management, also advocates for more recognition of the contributions and less
vilification of slum residents. See Solid Waste Management, ALMITRAPATEL.COM,
www.almitrapatel.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). For an analysis of how these cases
signify a shift in how nuisance has been redefined in the opinions of the last ten
years—from activities in the slum which constitute nuisance to the slums themselves
as nuisance, see generally D. Asher Ghertner, Analysis of New Legal Discourse
Behind Delhi’s Slum Demolitions, ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 17, 2008, at 57.
166. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393, ¶ 1
(Delhi H.C.).
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In explaining the first set, the Court quoted from one of the
petitions which detailed how the jhuggi cluster had come up in the
previous three to four years, how they had caused many miseries on
the residents, and how the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) had
visited and ordered that the area should be cleaner.167 In order to be
cleaner, according to the petition, the DDA declared that the area the
slum residents were using to ease themselves was meant to be “green”
and “beautiful” and that, therefore, the slum population should be
“restricted” to the area outside of the green area, with latrine
facilities.168 The quoted petition also stated that the DDA’s orders
included that there should be four to five chowkidars (guards) to keep
the area clean.169 It appears that these directions, however, were not
implemented, and the resulting situation had given rise to these
petitions.
Applying the second set of petitions—those of the slum residents—
the Court referred to one petition that narrated the following: the
lack of rural employment that led to their migration to cities; the fact
that jhuggi populations such as this one comprised twenty-five
percent of Delhi population; and how these populations supply a
major portion of the work force—from manual jobs in both domestic
and commercial fields to more skilled jobs in the industrial sectors—
in effect, “making a significant contribution to the economic life of
the city.”170 The petition also alleged that the failure of the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (MCD) to eradicate poor drainage systems
caused the contaminated water in their residences that attracted
mosquitoes and created serious health consequences for the local
populations.171 As the Court quoted, the petition also discussed how
there have been numerous policy decisions to upgrade their slum, but
that nothing ever transpired from them.172 Finally, the petitioner
cited to Article 21 for the Right to Life, noting that it included the
right of shelter and basic facilities to enable each citizen to live his life
with minimum human dignity.173
After laying out these petitions, the Court built another narrative
for how Delhi has ended up with the huge housing shortage that
resulted in this slum. The turn away from the contextual narrative

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. ¶¶ 3–6.
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 7.

Id. ¶¶ 7–10.
Id. ¶ 8.
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given by the slum residents above is subtle at parts—the Court
sympathized with those without housing when it noted “the misery of
the homeless” in having to pay slum lords but ultimately conflated
these populations and held the Delhi government responsible for
failing to prevent the growth of slums.174
In its exploration of the cause of the housing shortage, the Court
first analyzed the history of the DDA—whose purpose was the
“orderly development of the city.”175 The orderly development was
meant to be accomplished through the various ‘Master Plans’ of Delhi
through the decades, which developed lands, provided basic
amenities, and built residential and commercial complexes,
“according to needs and aspirations of people.”176 The Court then
explored what has thwarted the accomplishment of these goals and
finds that blame should be placed not only on the Delhi government
who had failed at multiple points to prevent such “encroachments,”177
but also on the “influx of people from all over the country” that has
“posed [a] stupendous housing problem” resulting in “rampant
construction activity, legal as well as illegal.”178
The Court listed various types of illegal construction and stated
that they were only concerned with jhuggis here.179 The court
recognized that the “goal of every good administration is to have the
capital city without slums,” and that this is a concern worldwide, but
that “it is not necessary to address this issue in great detail.”180 With
that, the court moved its analysis to the “slum lords,” whom it saw as
profiting from the illegal construction. Similar to Almitra Patel, the
case furthers a certain story of who was benefiting from the slums.
The Court spent significant energy on this point, including the
following:

174. Id. ¶ 19.
175. Id. ¶ 14.
176. Id.
177. After discussing the agencies’ civic duty to remove the jhuggis, it states:
[I]t does not require any great intelligence to know that it is because of the
negligence, carelessness or rather active connivance of the officials of these
Departments as well as others, at the helm of affairs that these
encroachments take place and slums are created. In these petitions, itself,
this Court passed Orders time and again to the effect that the concerned
authorities including the Police Department shall ensure that no further
Jhuggi/jhopri come up while the Court is considering these matters.
Id. ¶ 18.
178. Id. ¶ 14. The abridged nature of this history will be explored infra Part
III.B.3.
179. Pitam Pura, I.L.R. 2 (Del.) ¶ 15.
180. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
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Countless slum lords who have cropped in public land are making
large untaxed income every month out of the misery of the
homeless. No doubt, shelter for every citizen is an imperative of any
good government, but there are cleaner ways to achieve that goal
than converting public property into slum lords’ illegal estates.181

Once the existence of the slums is framed as primarily benefiting
‘slum lords,’ the only solution appears to be to demolish the slums.
The Court opines that provision of shelter for the homeless cannot be
in the form of these slums that benefit the slum lords—to do that
would fail to distinguish “humanitarianism . . . from miscarriage of
mercy.”182
What should happen to these homeless citizens, however, is left for
another day, as the Court explicitly stated that it will address the
eradication of jhuggis but not their rehabilitation. It did, however,
close at least some doors to rehabilitation by ordering the demolition
of slums not already protected by the Delhi government and the
dismissal of petitions by the certain evicted populations, saying that
the residents were “unauthorised occupants” living on
“encroachments of public land” and therefore had “no legal right to
maintain such a Petition.”183
Once the slums are seen as the projects of slum lords, and parts of
their populations lose the right to petition their removal, then the
narrative of the second set petitions laid out above—regarding the
history of how they got there, the importance of their economic
contribution, the lack of implementation of plans by the MCD—
become moot points. The orders of the Court, then, did not have to
include provisions for the welfare of these residents, and it expanded
on the framing of the illegality and illegitimacy of the poor to reside
in their homes.184
The order, which instructed the government to demolish slums that
were not already specifically protected by government order, would
have huge implications for further cases. Here was the Delhi High

181. Id. ¶ 19.
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶ 20.
184. Id. ¶ 18 (stating “[t]here is large scale encroachment of public land by the
persons who come from other States and after encroaching upon public land, they
construct Jhuggi/jhopri . . . . There is no denying the fact that no person has right to
encroach public land. It also goes without saying that if there is such encroachment it
is the statutory duty cast upon the civic authorities like. M.C.D., N.D.M.C., as well as
the DDA to remove such encroachments, be it by the lower strata creating slums or
by other residents who encroach public land and make unauthorised constructions of
big buildings thereon.”)
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Court, one of the most influential courts in India, citing Almitra Patel
with approval and reinforcing the framing of the urban poor and the
duty of the local government to clear them from their spaces.

3.

Okhla Factory Owners, or the Loss of History

Later that year, the Delhi High Court took this stance on the
illegality of slum residences a step further and did away with almost
all rights to rehabilitation. In Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v.
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi,185 the Court
again faced the situation of slum settlements on public land. In this
case, the government had decided to develop land that it had
acquired decades before from farmers. In constructing the history of
the current situation, Justice Kaul’s opinion provided a detailed
account of various regulations that should be followed in the event of
removal of a population.186 It also detailed the history of the various
resettlement policies and what the government provided to the
populations.187 While the opinion discussed the failure of government
plans to effectively upgrade or rehabilitate existing slums, it framed
the problem as one of limited resources: there is not enough land in
Delhi, according to the Court, to accommodate these populations.188
Not unlike Pitam Pura, the Court blamed the migrants who came
to Delhi every year in search of employment for the ‘proliferation’ of
jhuggis/squatter settlements.189 And in the end, it went on to place
blame for the health environment of the entire city on these slums,
despite some recognition of the housing shortage: “[t]his [lack of lowcost housing] has resulted in haphazard and unhygienic mushrooming
of slums in the urban areas causing a lot of damage to the health
environment of the city as a whole.”190
Also like in Pitam Pura, the Court sympathized with the homeless
by recognizing the paucity of low-cost housing but did not seem to
take this sympathy into consideration in the ruling: the situation of
the homeless might be unfortunate, but it did not make encroachment
an option. And so while the opinion did acknowledge: “[i]t has been
stated that the slums are products of structural inequality in the socioeconomic development and that the authorities have been unable to

185. Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi,
(2002) 108 D.L.T. 517 (Delhi H.C.).
186. Id. ¶¶ 3–8.
187. Id. ¶¶ 4–22.
188. Id. ¶ 40.
189. Id. ¶ 8.
190. Id. ¶ 10.
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provide affordable . . . low cost housing,”191 it proceeded to do away
with any measures that at least allow them to stay where they are.
Finally, the Court recognized that while the Delhi government has
“admit[ted] its responsibility to provide shelter,” it has also “stated
that it has been unable to do so.”192
Another missing part of the history is how the public land itself was
taken from citizens in order to build the city. The public entity tasked
with the development of Delhi, the DDA, who owns much of the land
on which slum residents reside in Delhi, obtained ownership of this
land through displacing farmers and villages or taking over
unoccupied land during the 1950s and 60s. It acquired the land in the
name of development for public purpose.193 The city plans at that
point included affordable housing,194 but were never pursued
adequately. When the history of displacement for the public good is
drawn upon, it is done to support the single view that the poor do not
have any entitlement or should not have any expectation of
accommodation. In short, the court referred to this history of
displacement to argue that it would not have been right to have taken
from those farmers and to let the poor live there, ignoring the original
plans which would have in fact accommodated them.195 Moreover,
this neglects to consider that some communities who face eviction
have been there for decades, and their expectation of some level of
recognition by the local government is not baseless—some
communities were accommodated by the local government with
allocation for water, electricity, and other needs by formal and
informal networks of patronage with the elite in ways that have
broken down over the past few decades.196
Once this history is left out, or told with the framing described
above, there is no room to acknowledge the economic and social
constraints within which these populations live—decreasing
employment opportunities in the rural areas, lack of low cost housing

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. ¶ 42.
194. See 1962 MASTER PLAN, supra note 132, at 5–6.
195. Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T. ¶ 42.
196. See Chatterjee, supra note 144, at 171–73, 176–77. When part of the history of
resettlement is presented in Okhla Factory Owners, it is in the terms of what the
government provided, not how many were left out of this system, and how many
more would be after their opinion. See Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T. 517.
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in cities, the former expectations of on-site accommodations, or even
the lack of servants’ quarters that used to be available.197
In the face of this lack of provision for shelter or low cost housing
for the migrants who come to Delhi for work, and the apparent
shortage of land, this court then abolished any remaining right or
expectation of rehabilitation. The previous cases were important
foundations for this ruling and are used to make this decision look
like an application of the various precedents, rather than a further
chipping away of rights. It drew on Olga Tellis for its qualification on
the rights of pavement and slum residents—that providing an
alternative site for living is not a condition precedent for eviction. It
also quoted with approval the observation in Pitam Pura that
humanitarianism must be separate from miscarriage of mercy when it
discusses who benefits from the slums.198 This allowed the Court to
conclude that:
[T]he continuing existence of such a policy [of rehabilitation] serves
no social purpose. Such a policy without any social criteria, is illegal
and arbitrary and we hereby proceed to quash the same which
requires alternative sites to be provided to slum dwellers occupying
public land before they can be removed from such public land.199

The Court went on to direct the parties, inter alia, that while
existing government orders should be abided by, “no allotment will
be converted into ownership basis as is proposed by the Government
of NCT of Delhi in its policy guidelines for implementation of the
Scheme for relocation,” “[n]o alternative sites are to be provided in
future for removal of persons who are squatting on public land,” and
“[e]ncroachers and squatters on public land should be removed
expeditiously without any pre-requisite requirement of providing
them alternative sites before such encroachment is removed or
cleared.”200 As Usha Ramanathan succinctly noted, the Court “shot
down the resettlement policy of the state and, in doing so, absolved

197. See DASGUPTA, supra note 6, at 362–70 (describing how upper level small
terrace apartments that used to accommodate servants are now increasingly being
rented out to young people choosing to move out of family homes). While the
evidence that Dasgupta offers is anecdotal, it fits my observations while living in
Delhi as well, and is also supported by Chatterjee’s analysis of the breakdown of elite
and poor systems of patronage. Chatterjee, supra note 144, at 171–73, 176–77.
198. Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T. ¶ 46.
199. Id. ¶ 47. The Court also states that it will be “open” to the government to
“devise a policy for rehabilitation of the economically weaker sections based on a
legitimate criteria but the criteria cannot be encroachment on public land.” Id.
200. Id. ¶ 49.
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the state of its obligation to assist the urban poor in accessing
affordable housing.”201
In sum, through this line of cases, the Supreme Court and the Delhi
High Court moved slum residents from getting rehabilitation under
certain circumstances to not having any such rights (outside of the
recognition of particular fairly narrow government orders already in
place before these judgments).
IV. THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF
‘MODERN’ CITIES AND CITIZENS THROUGH SIGNALS TO PRIVATE
INVESTORS
“Besides, Delhi being the capital city of the country, is a show

window to the world of our culture, heritage, traditions and way of
life. A city like Delhi must act as a catalyst for building modern
India.”202

Constructing cityscapes to create a national identity that impresses
tourists and the rest of the world has been a facet of city planning for
centuries. Delhi, in particular, has an interesting history of whom it
was meant to impress both internally and externally. The city had
been built over multiple times before the English re-planned and
rebuilt parts of the governmental area in the 1900s.203 When they did
so, they wanted it to “illustrate a rational modernity” and, according
to the private secretary to King George V, “let the Indian ‘see for the
first time the power of Western science, art and civilization.’”204
Clearly, the power of architecture and urban planning to convey an
identity, and in doing so, to intimidate, impress, and shape a
population, are not new to Delhi.205
In the present day, once again we can conduct a careful analysis of
the judgments to find judicial support of the projects embodied in
recent changes in urban landscapes. The quote that began this Part
and others found in judgments206 intertwine ideas of culture, national
201. Ramanathan, supra note 141, at 3195.
202. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393, ¶ 11
(Delhi H.C.) (referring to the secretary of Urban Development).
203. See WILLIAM DALYRYMPLE, CITY OF DJINNS: A YEAR IN DELHI (2003).
204. KHILNANI, supra note 36, at 121.
205. For a fascinating architectural and sociological account of modern
architecture and city planning in India, see generally, RAHUL MEHROTRA,
ARCHITECTURE IN INDIA: SINCE 1990 (2011).
206. See, e.g., Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 679 (India) (stating
that the previous Court had tried to prevent “the capital of the biggest democracy in
the world” from being “branded as being one of the most polluted cities in the world”
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pride, and modernity with city identity and assessment through the
gaze of foreigners. The articulation of these in cases involving poor
populations’ right to their residences links these projects and issues
together. It implicitly and explicitly justifies the clearance of slums
for the ‘higher’ ideals listed.
To understand the quote above and the context it operates in, one
should consider who is looking through this show window—who is
being impressed—and for what reason? Specifically, the references in
judgments to show pieces207 and show windows reveal the elevation of
assessments of the rest of the world regarding matters of pride for
Delhi.
The rebuilding and reconstructing and projection of
modernity is about more than tourism or national pride. As this
section explores, at the time these cases were decided, economic
policy in India was heavily directed towards the attraction of capital
for various avenues, particularly FDI. And, as we’ve seen throughout
the political economic history of India, the courts in this moment as
well are playing very tangible roles in paving the way for this kind of
development.
This part draws together the analysis presented in the previous
Parts and places the slum clearance opinions in context of economic
development in India. First, it studies the increased role of
investment in real estate in the economy. It then explores the
judiciary’s roles in sending affirming signals to capital through the
rhetoric of strong property rights, a disciplined city and citizenry, and
urban beautification. Finally, we must consider whether there were
alternatives to the emphasis on these particular signals—are there
other discursive narratives that the courts could draw from with
regards to the position of the poor in the economy and in cities? In
order to show the potential of possible narratives other than the
dominant neoliberal one that has been explored in detail, several
cases that treat slum residents in a more inclusionary way are
investigated in hope that they will be drawn upon by courts more
frequently in the future.

and that Delhi, as the capital of the country, should “be its show piece” so there
should be more efforts to keep it clean); see also Jason Burke, Modi Launches Indian
Clean-up Drive by Telling Officials: Get Sweeping, GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/02/modi-launches-indian-clean-upcampaign (discussing the recent campaign by India’s Prime Minister to “Clean
India”).
207. See Almitra Patel, 2 S.C.C. ¶ 11.
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A. The Rise of Capital Investments in City Spaces
The development of city space has been of particular interest to
international capital during the past few decades—an interest that has
been increasingly supported by government policies.208 In the 2012–
13 Industrial Report of the Department of Industry Policy and
Promotion, the Indian government took care to show how its efforts
to attract FDI have paid off—it cites reports from the United Nations
Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation, and Ernst & Young that all declare
India to be one of the most attractive places in the world for FDI.209
Indeed, total FDI flows have increased considerably in the 2000s and
to-date:210 FDI has increased from approximately four to six million
dollars per year in the financial years 2001 to 2005, to between thirtyfive and forty-seven million dollars per year in the financial years
2008 to 2014.211 This is significant growth, occurring even during the
Financial Crisis around the world.
More specifically, the
“Construction and Development: Townships, Housing, and Built-up
infrastructure” sector received the second-highest percentage of all
FDI in 2012–2013, with eleven percent.212
The focus on urban construction in particular is no surprise. Urban
development has been touted as the place to invest and for India to

208. As reported by India Knowledge at Wharton in 2006, a number of U.S.
investment banks, including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and
Merrill Lynch invested in real estate. See Why U.S. Investors are Building Their
Hopes on Indian Real Estate, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct. 31, 2006),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-u-s-investors-are-building-theirhopes-on-indian-real-estate/. For the foundational argument regarding global cities
as key spatial units and strategic territories of development, and the role of
international capital in this transformation, see SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY:
NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2d ed., 2001).
209. UNCTAD ranked India as the third most attractive location for FDI, the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation ranked India as the second most
promising country for overseas business operations for medium-term and first as a
long term investment destination, and Ernst & Young found India fourth as a global
destination for FDI. DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE & INDUS., ANNUAL REPORT: 2012-13 84 (2013), available at
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/Annual_Reports/AnnualReport_Eng_201213.pdf.
210. The early increases in growth that India had after the 1991 reforms were not
driven by large external borrowings or external capital flows. See FRANKEL, supra
note 42, at 595.
211. See DEP’T OF INDUS. POLICY & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE &
INDUS., FACT SHEET ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 4 (2014), available at
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/2014/india_FDI_May2014.pdf.
212. The service sector received the highest percentage of FDI, at eighteen
percent. Id. at 8.
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focus on for over a decade. In a 705-page report in 2001 on strategies
for growth, McKinsey Global Institute advocated for India to further
liberalize their economy through various reforms.213 In particular,
McKinsey pointed to “inflexible zoning, rent, and tenancy laws” that
“‘freeze’ land in city centres that would otherwise be available for
new retail outlets and retail.”214 Nine years later in 2010, the
McKinsey Global Institute placed its faith squarely in the urban in a
report titled: India’s Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities,
Sustaining Economic Growth. The report discussed how “cities will
be central to India’s economic future,” on account of the rapid
urbanization and jobs.215 To meet this projected demand in Indian
cities, massive construction would be needed—including “700–900
million square meters of commercial and residential space . . . —or a
new Chicago every year,” “2.5 billion square meters of roads,” and
“7,400 kilometers of metros and subways” by 2030.216 Such projects
were estimated to require $1.2 trillion of capital investment. Largescale construction is already underway in many cities, including Delhi.
In fact, real estate now constitutes nineteen percent of Delhi’s
contribution to GDP.217 As noted in Part III, the new places of
middle class consumption—residential high-rises, international-style
malls, and offices—are all evidence of this exponential growth of
industry.
How, then, have cities and their planners furthered endeavors to
attract foreigners and foreign capital? As Swapna Guha-Banerjee
notes, “[a]pparently the essential objective is to make these cities
sufficiently investment friendly, acceptable to the credit rating
agencies and help them emerge as geostrategic points to further
neoliberalism in the Global South.”218 Cities such as Delhi are not
passively having neoliberalism furthered through them. Urban

213. It also advocates for loosening of controls on FDI, removal of complex
licensing requirements (deregulation), greater law enforcement, and privatization of
electricity services. See generally BILL LEWIS ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST.,
INDIA: THE GROWTH IMPERATIVE (2001), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/
insights/india/growth_imperative_for_india (follow “Full Report” hyperlink).
214. See id. at 5.
215. See SANKHE ET AL., supra note 98, at 14–15. The report also discusses
“inclusive” growth by growing affordable housing stock at length, noting that housing
makes citizens “formal residents” of cities and that it increases consumption. See id.
at 119–38. Their suggestions include a mix of local government funding, incentives to
developers, and other polices. See id.
216. Id. at 9.
217. See MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, supra note 101, at 65.
218. Swapna Banerjee-Guha, Neoliberalising the ‘Urban’: New Geographies of
Power and Injustice in Indian Cities, ECON. & POL. WKLY., May 30, 2009, at 95.
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plans219 and public-private partnerships show the cities’ willingness to
develop their own spaces according to the needs of capital. The next
section explores the role of the courts in supporting the arrival of
capital investments in cities.
B.

The Role of Courts in the ‘Frictionless Landing’ 220 of Capital
Investments in City Spaces

The language in the Pitam Pura quote that began this Part—a city’s
need to act as a catalyst—recognizes the high burden of responsibility
on the city in the attraction of international capital. How does a court
support this endeavor of modernity in the new neoliberal urban
development paradigm—specifically, in the pursuit of international
capital? As the cases illustrate, by enabling the clearing out of city
centers, by beautifying it for the visiting potential investors, tourists,
and TV cameras, and by doing this all legally so that the ‘rule of law’
and ‘strong property rights’ remain unblemished.221 The very
language that the courts use to describe these priorities strengthens
the larger discourse of this singular vision of neoliberal urban
development. The route to beautification in the various cases is
through the removal of slums and the shrinkage of space for certain
populations—the removal apparently of un-modern ways of life in an
effort to carry out the showing of “our . . . way of life” and “modern
India” as noted in Pitam Pura.222
And so, through the opinions explored above, the courts do not
just rely on an outside legitimacy constituted by development
discourse; they play a crucial role in constituting this discourse as well
through a variety of ways. Two themes are explored here: the
support of capital investment in land (in line with neoliberal
development), and the rewarding or disciplining of citizens according
to their alignment with the new vision of modernity.

219. For example, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
(JNNURM)—the urban renewal plans launched in 2005. See About Us,
JAWAHARLAL NEHRU NAT’L URB. RENEWAL MISSION, http://jnnurm.nic.in/aboutus.html.
220. See MEHROTRA, supra note 205.
221. These changes are important factors in signaling a government’s commitment
to attract business. According to the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business project
ranking system, “[h]igher ranks indicate simpler regulation and stronger protections
of property rights.” See WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS 2007: HOW TO REFORM
74 (2007), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20
Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB07-FullReport.pdf.
222. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393, ¶ 11
(Delhi H.C.). Note that ‘way’ of life is singular.
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Signals to Investors

These judgments and other recent ones have been characterized as
direct support for corporate interests.223 In a 2009 article in the
widely-read magazine Economic & Political Weekly, well-known
human rights advocate Prashant Bhushan analyzed recent judgments
by the Supreme Court that include sympathetic language to corporate
interests and noted that “it is difficult not to get the feeling that
court’s decisions were influenced by its own approval of the new
polities of liberalisation, privatization and globalization.”224 Bhushan
is in good company in this assessment with a member of the Court
itself: in 2010, Justice Singhvi, then a justice of the Indian Supreme
Court, lamented the “visible shift” in social welfare cases.225 In a
judicial opinion, he stated that “attractive mantras of globalisation
and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d’etre of the judicial
process . . . .”226
The opinions studied here support the attraction of capital in
several ways. First, by espousing formality and the rhetoric of strong
property rights, they reinforce what the World Bank and private
financial actors need to feel confident to invest.227 Second, their
orders to the city agencies and police to be more vigilant in enforcing
the law and protecting property, and also making the city beautiful,
indicate to would-be investors that property rights are protected and
therefore more certain and that spaces are modern and clean
physically. That said, these chastisements of the city agencies can be
read in more than one way—perhaps as keeping the cities in line with
India’s broader commitment to development, or perhaps as part of
larger themes in neoliberalism regarding reducing ineffectual
government.

a.

Formality, Property Rights, and Rights of the Poor

Protection of property rights is an important part of attracting
investment (and of neoliberalism more generally).228 This protection

223. In particular, Prashant Bhushan sees the post-economic liberalization
Supreme Court as “solicitous towards large corporates.” Suresh & Narrain, supra
note 58, at 11. See also Bhushan, Supreme Court, supra note 123.
224. See Bhushan, Supreme Court, supra note 123, at 1772.
225. Suresh & Narrain, supra note 58, at 11.
226. Id. (quoting Harjinder Singh v. Punjab Warehousing Corp., (2010) 3 S.C.C.
192 (India)). Justice Singhvi went on to observe that the courts are no longer
listening to the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. Id. at 11–12.
227. See generally WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 221.
228. See generally id.; HARVEY, supra note 103.
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may include a number of features, such as adequate land records,
clear title, and judicial enforcement of property rights, and can be
seen as an underlying motif in the slum clearance cases. In these
cases, legitimate property rights and rights holders are constructed in
contrast to what is perceived to be informal. In short, these cases
construct an ideal of “formal” property entitlements that deserve
protection through several justifications. Almitra Patel’s vilification
of informality—of squatters, of informal labor (who often live in the
kinds of slums they describe), and of informal work (which requires
living nearby)—typifies the rhetorical valuing of the formal and the
clean. Pitam Pura’s casting of “residents” whose welfare and other
rights under Article 21 cannot be “sacrificed,” in contrast to the “slum
dwellers,” whose rights under Article 21 are not even acknowledged,
again illustrates the intertwining of formality and entitlement to
rights.229 Moreover, those in the middle class neighborhoods nearby
are not asked to prove their formal rights to possession—they are
assumed to have them, whereas those living on open land are not
(despite the fact that much of Delhi property is “on the border of
informality and legality”230). In Okhla Factory Owners, this valuing
of formality can be seen in the Court’s defense of Delhi’s right to its
(expropriated) land. Despite not having used it, despite the presence
of marginalized populations who had come to depend on it, the right
of the city to exercise use of land it had legally—however expansively
this term is interpreted—made its own was deemed paramount. And
so we end up with a new constellation of property rights and
governance, and as Upendra Baxi argued in 2006, “demolitions,
which were once seen as excesses perpetrated during the Emergency,
now come to be seen as the badges of good governance.”231
This turn towards formality with regards to property and space
renders even the human rights associated with clearance of slums,
including the right to housing, hollow. The emphasis on formality
makes property-related rights rhetorical devices, used to justify
further marginalizing the poor legally through creating contrasts

229. Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393, ¶ 19
(Delhi H.C.) (“The welfare, health, maintenance of law and order, safety and
sanitation of these residents cannot be sacrificed and their right under Article 21 is
violated in the name of social justice to the slum dwellers.”). The Court also quoted
one of the petitioners, who lamented the fact that “young girls do not come to their
own balconies throughout the day as obnoxious smell pollute the atmosphere and the
entire environment is [unconducive] to public health and morality.” Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis
added); see also Ghertner, supra note 165, at 62.
230. MENON-SEN & BHAN, supra note 8, at 3.
231. Suresh & Narrain, supra note 58, at 11.

2014]

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN INDIA

81

between them and the formal. It also allows property rights to trump
other rights (such as the right to dignity) in ways that are portrayed as
being in society’s best interests. Even when the rights of the poor in
housing are respected in a formal sense, such rights lose their
substantive meaning through their implementation.232 For example,
calling upon one’s right to housing in the face of demolition often
reveals an increased role of formality with regards to rehabilitation.
There is more and more red tape for rehabilitation, and so even
when relocation is offered (on the outskirts of the city), Delhi policies
give strict licenses to inhabit the alternate housing.233 Residents do
not get leaseholds or routes to ownership. These residences cannot
be alienated or rented out, and there does not appear to be any route
to property for the residents. Often, slum residents face problems
proving that they have been in their homes long enough to qualify for
rehabilitation. Such housing is often in architectural forms that do
not fit their living patterns or needs.234 Moreover, the location on the
outskirts hampers their ability to get to employment, particularly for
women.235 This mismatch of needs and housing—where perhaps
‘shelter’ has been technically accommodated for, but at the expense
of one’s participation in the city or one’s ability to conduct the life
and livelihood that is fulfilling and sustainable—reveals the hollow
nature of the purported fulfillment of these rights. And, of course,
these policies do not even begin to address the various attachments
that people have to their homes (psychological, historical, use). Nor
do they account for the importance of community life, which is
altered, if not destroyed, when people have to shift to other locations.
How can such intangibles be accounted for in strictly formal
interpretations of rights? In other words, too narrow of an
interpretation on what it means to fill an obligation to a ‘right to
shelter’236 does not recognize any sort of broader, more existential
right participate in or shape the city in which these residents live.237
232. Balakrishnan Rajagopal characterizes the forms of socio-economic rights
being promulgated more generally as pro human rights but anti-poor. Pro-Human

Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a
Social Movement Perspective, 18 HUMAN RTS. REV. 157, 157 (2007).
233. See, e.g., MENON-SEN & BHAN, supra note 8, at 9–15, 36–43, 86–89.
234. See MEHROTRA, supra note 205 (discussing the small square footage, boxed in
high rise apartments that are a far cry from the community life that people seek to
have); see also CHARLES CORREA, Space as a Resource, in THE NEW LANDSCAPE
(1985), reprinted in THE OXFORD ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 292 (regarding the
five ways that people use space—the range of ‘public space’).
235. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
236. While the Right to Housing language is broad and recognizes the emotional
attachments to one’s home, the implementation and interpretation of it has been
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Even when rights for the marginalized were accommodated with
more substance—such as in Olga Tellis—they were accommodated as
an exception to the legitimate citizenry of a city who were (literally,
walking) on the path of legitimacy. It is not that, even in Olga Tellis,
the residents of slums and pavement are recognized as part of a
broader economic system of inclusive growth. This view of them as
an anomaly to the legitimate political economic system is reinforced
and constituted by how they are seen in the legal discourses examined
here.

b.

City Governance and Beautification

In the slum clearance cases, the courts have not shied from
chastising the city of Delhi. They call upon the city government to
protect their own property,238 keep the city clean,239 and follow
through with its planning projects. 240 These attempts to keep cities
‘in line’ can be read as signals of judicial support of re-making cities
into places to which capital would respond well241—disciplined,
property rights-enforcing, respectful of rule of law, and, of course,
clean. From these judgments, one is left with the impression that the
courts are willing to be ‘tough’ on both cities and citizenry in order to
get them to change their patterns. Relatedly, the courts also mention
that the police should be used to protect land from the slum
residents—another strong reinforcement of discipline and
lawfulness.242
Along with beautification and keeping the city clean are the
contrasts that are set up with relation to slum areas as unhygienic and
unhealthy for the environment. For example, as part of the
justification for removal, the Court in Okhla Factory Owners
lamented the “unhygienic mushrooming of slums” and attributed

limited at best. See generally, HOUS. & LAND RIGHTS NETWORK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TO ADEQUATE HOUSING AND LAND IN INDIA: PARALLEL REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
(2008).
237. See HARVEY, supra note 104.
238. See generally Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory
of Delhi, (2002) 108 D.L.T. 517 (Delhi H.C.) (discussed supra Part III).
239. See Almitra Patel v. Union of India, (2000) 2 S.C.C. 679 (India) (discussed
supra Part III).
240. See generally Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T.; Pitam Pura Sudhar Samiti
v. Union of India, (2002) I.L.R. 2 (Del.) 393 (Delhi H.C.) (discussed supra Part III).
241. See discussion supra Part III.
242. See Pitam Pura, I.L.R. 2 (Del.) ¶ 15. And so, while they chastise the city
governments’ ineffectiveness, they also draw up on it to enforce the law.
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“damage to the health environment of the city as a whole” to them.243
This is an echo of Almitra Patel where the cleanliness and health of
the entire city is seen to be at risk through the presence of slums.244
Prashant Bhushan ties this kind of rhetoric to support of corporate
interests. He has argued that the emphasis on the environment has
come to be used as a shield—the poor end up losing out in the face of
justifications for clearance based on the environment.245 This is
accomplished through the “right to a clean and healthy environment”
being read into Article 21, which, as Bhushan notes, allows
“individual benches of the court [to use] their own subjective
understanding of what [is] needed for a healthy and clean
environment.”246
This subjectivity, in recent years, has led to
corporates getting more favorable treatment than the poor.247

2.

Shaping the Citizenry

The support for middle class ways of life and the capital interests
that build and benefit from these ways of life can be seen in the way
in which certain populations benefit from the rulings, in the
disciplining of the poor through the language of hygiene and
sanitation, and in the references to law enforcement and
beautification. The cases above slowly cast slum residents as
encroachers, associating them with ‘pickpockets’ and thieves, further
confirming their illegitimacy and lack of right to exist in public space,
even when they do not have access to private space. This evolution
can be seen through the cases: if the theme of Almitra Patel was the
supposed unsanitary ways of life of slum residents, then in Pitam Pura
it was whose rights should be respected (the ‘residents’ or the ‘slum
dwellers’), and finally in Okhla Factory Owners it is who, in the face
of scarce resources (land), should get priority (the productive middle
class). It must be noted that those who are given property rights are
those who already live a more apparently legitimate existence—in
better areas with higher property values, and in locations that enable
them to be a part of urban consumerism in those spaces.

243. Okhla Factory Owners, 108 D.L.T. ¶ 10.
244. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.b.
245. See Bhushan, Misplaced Priorities, supra note 123, at 37. Moreover, as argued
by Asher Ghertner, the rhetorical focus on the environment has also shifted
jurisprudence and illegalized the poor by equating slums and slum residents with
nuisance—rather than certain activities as nuisance. See Ghertner, supra note 165.
246. Prashant Bhushan, Sacrificing Human Rights and Environmental Rights at
the Altar of “Development”, 41 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 389, 395 (2009).
247. See Bhushan, Misplaced Priorities, supra note 123, at 37.
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Similar to the construction of the peasant as “baffled by modern
political and economic institutions,”248 the construction of the urban
slum resident as baffled in the new world of technology or
consumption does not hold up. These poor are not alien to modern
India—not only because they exist in the present day249 and live lives
that depend on technology, capitalism, and political institutions
implicated by modernity, but because these capitalistic ways of life of
broader society depend on the urban poor for sustainability. The
urban poor populations construct and maintain the malls, homes,
cars, roads, and other spaces that are celebrated as ‘modern.’ And so,
the dark irony in Almitra Patel and the other cases chastising the
poor for their hygiene and sanitation in the name of modernity is that
(ignoring for a moment the prejudiced and false nature of these
characterizations with regards to the residences of the poor), they are
called upon to perform the very services that further the projects of
modernity. The disciplining of the poor through the appeal to
sanitation or public health, however, is not unique to India or to this
time period.250
The Pitam Pura quote above that expressed hope that Delhi will be
a catalyst was used to close the opinion—to provide the final
justification for removing slum areas and to support beautification.
The justification of tourism and a modern India is presented in an
uncritical way. The elevation of foreign gaze (or, in other parts of the
opinion, that of middle class residents) is treated as a given. This
prioritization has huge effects for the poor. If their gaze (or their
provision) is not the focus, then they are disciplined into noninterference with the middle class or the foreign experience of, or
investment in, city life.
The chipping away of rehabilitation and rights described above
further decreases the government’s obligation to take even minimal
responsibility for its citizens. The distance from rights language and
rights enforcement (which is used only in regards to the legitimate
citizens) puts slum residents far from entitlement to anything
property or resource related. From there, they can only come to the
government as beggars asking for handouts, rather than displaced

248. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 25, at 9.
249. See CHAKRABARTY, supra note 36.
250. See generally MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN
ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans.,Vintage
Books 1994); see also ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY IN THE COLONIAL CONTEST (1995); TIMOTHY MITCHELL, RULE OF
EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY (Univ. Cal. Press 2002).
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citizens with grievances. If they are not entitled to anything, then
‘giving’ them the minimum—shelter on the outskirts of the city,
licenses to live there without route to ownership, and strict
requirements for proving entitlement to these paltry measures—is
considered charitable provision. Indeed, the first line of Okhla
Factory Owners saw rehabilitation as just that—benevolence—not
the obligation of government: “Benevolence in administration is a
necessity but this benevolence has to be balanced against the rights of
the residents of a town specially when dealing with one commodity
which can never increase which is land.”251
Once the slum residents are not seen as residents with rights, and
rehabilitation is merely benevolence, it is hardly surprising that such
provisions could be done away with.
C.

Alternative Narratives in Judicial Opinions

While many cases continue the line of reasoning and
marginalization detailed above, there are two recent Delhi-based
cases, which should be explored for the alternative account of law and
circumstances that they present.252 Unfortunately for now, these
potential alternative formulations appear to be just that, given their
treatment by subsequent courts—alternatives too far outside of the
mainstream orthodoxy regarding urban space and citizenry to change
the tide. However, while they remain minority judgments, their
presence in jurisprudential discourse otherwise dominated by
neoliberal tenets with regards to urban space should not be
underestimated. If and when change does happen, it is often through
such threads of dissent being woven into larger efforts with adoption
and adaptation. Therefore, once again, the analysis in this section
draws attention not only to the outcomes of the cases, but the rhetoric
the judges employ and the contexts they recognize.
In the first case, Sudama Singh v. Government of Delhi,253 Delhi
High Court Chief Justice, Ajit Prakash Shah, contextualized the
situation of the poor in Delhi by including a discussion of history and
values. He discussed the Delhi Master Plan, and paid particular
attention to the urban poor and the provisions for their

251. Okhla Factory Owners’ Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi,
(2002) 108 D.L.T. 517, ¶ 1 (Delhi H.C.).
252. There are also cases in various states of success or closure brought by the
Human Rights Law Network. See PILs & Cases, HUMAN RTS. L. NETWORK,
http://www.hrln.org/hrln/housing-rights/pils-a-cases.html (last visited Nov. 30 2014).
253. (2010) WP(C) Nos. 8904/2009, 7735/2007, 7317/2009, & 9246/2009 (Delhi
H.C.), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/39539866/.
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rehabilitation.254
This discussion framed rehabilitation within
economic development. In words that recalled the inclusive ideals of
development at Independence, he observed that “[t]he concept of
land as a resource should be adopted to develop such accommodation
with private sector participation and investment, to the extent
possible.”255
This attempted balancing is also evident in his treatment of Article
21. When addressing the petitioners’ claim that demolishing the
slums without ensuring relocation is violation of their fundamental
right to shelter enshrined in right to life under Article 21, he engaged
in a lengthy discussion of the human right to shelter, and how these
populations ended up living in slums.256 In his narrative, their intent
and migration is attributed to the “pressure on agricultural land and
lack of employment opportunities in the rural areas” and the large
number of people who were “forced” to move to cities for the
availability of employment opportunities in urban areas.257 He also
recognized how the “lack of access to legitimate housing” within their
means “compelled” them to live in slums.258
Finally, he demonstrated respect for their resilience and
participation in urban society by noting their varied livelihoods that
included many based on daily wages, such as selling vegetables and
other household items, as well as rickshaw pulling and several regular
positions in “industrial units in the vicinity.”259 This discussion
acknowledged that the women were employed as domestic help in
nearby houses and that some children were employed as child labor
and a few “fortunate [ones] . . . [went] to municipal schools in the
vicinity.”260 It is worth noting that the proximity for work and
education are vital to such populations, which he implicitly
acknowledged.
From this account of the situation and “precarious” existence of
the poor, he was then able to declare that they are not to be treated as
second-class citizens, and expressed concern at the “lack of basic
amenities at the relocated site.”261 In the end, he found that “[a]s
254. Id. ¶¶ 2–4.
255. See id. ¶ 4. These accommodations might include: incentives by way of higher
FAR, part commercial use of the land, and, if necessary and feasible, transfer of
Development Rights. Id.
256. See id. ¶¶ 37–44.
257. Id. ¶ 44.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. ¶¶ 26, 43, 60.
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long as they were not on an existing road,” they could not be denied
the benefit of rehabilitation/relocation.262 He also situated this ruling
in their right to life, stating that the “denial of the benefit of the
rehabilitation to the petitioners violates their right to shelter
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.”263
While this represented a major victory for the slum residents, and
an important check on the three cases above, the impact of this case
as a matter of law is not clear—it has not been taken up by
subsequent courts in the manner that Almitra Patel, Pitam Pura, or
Okhla Factory Owners have. It has only been cited by two cases:
Jagjit Singh v. Union of India264 (unfavorably, by the same judge that
presided over Okhla Factory Owners) and P.K. Koul v. Estate
Officer,265 discussed below.
In P.K. Koul, Delhi High Court Justice Gita Mittal presented an
alternative narrative that existed before the post-2000 cases. She
quoted extensively from P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat266 and
Chameli Singh v. State of U.P.267—Supreme Court cases which had
held that shelter was a fundamental right.268 In P.G. Gupta, the Court
held that “food, shelter and clothing are the minimal human rights”
and that “the right to residence and settlement . . . is a ‘fundamental
right under Article 19(1)(e) and it is a facet of inseparable meaningful
right to life under Article 21’ of the Constitution of India.”269 And in
Chameli Singh, the Court held that “the right to shelter is a
fundamental right available to every citizen of India.”270
Justice Mittal also drew from Chameli Singh to show the nature of
the Right to Life, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is not met
merely by attending to “the animal needs of man,” but rather, “[i]t is
secured only when he is assured of all facilities to develop himself and
is freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth.”271 Justice Mittal
262. Id. ¶ 4.
263. Id. ¶ 52.
264. (2010) WP(C) No. 2806-2934/2004 (Delhi H.C.), available at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/36602992/.
265. (2010)
WP(C)
No.
15239/2004
(Delhi
H.C.),
available
at
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/84234324/.
266. (1994) 2 S.C.C. 182 (India).
267. (1996) 2 S.C.C. 549 (India).
268. Unfortunately, the formulation of the right to shelter found in these cases was
not drawn upon by the slum clearance cases that are cited extensively and studied
here.
269. See P.K. Koul, (2010) WP(C) No. 15239/2004 ¶ 25 (Delhi H.C.) (citing and
quoting P.G. Gupta, 2 S.C.C.).
270. Id. (citing Chameli Singh, 2 S.C.C.).
271. Id. (quoting Chameli Singh, 2 S.C.C.).
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incorporated additional language from Chameli Singh that read “the
right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and
shelter” into the Right to Life, arguing that they are basic human
rights and that the human rights enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and Convention and the Constitution
of India “cannot be exercised without these basic human rights.”272
With regard to shelter in particular, she recognizes the complexity of
factors and the matters of dignity entwined in one’s living space by
quoting the Supreme Court’s eloquent statement that:
Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his
life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow
physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter,

therefore, includes adequate living space and decent structures,
clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water,
electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as
to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter,
therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but
right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and
develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an
essential requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been
guaranteed as a fundamental right.273

Finally, not unlike the Court in Olga Tellis, she recognized the
history of this population and their displacement (in this case, from
Kashmir). In the end, she found for the displaced, but restricted the
holding to situations where security is an issue.274
This account, and its respectful language towards the poor and
appreciation of the context of their residences, stands in marked

272. Id. (quoting Chameli Singh, 2 S.C.C.).
273. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Chameli Singh, 2 S.C.C.). She also comments
on the nature of the judicial interpretation, and that it must remain relevant, and
quotes Justice Bhagwati that the laws “change with the changing social concepts and
values.” Id. ¶ 88. The full quote illustrates the importance of studying the role of the
judiciary against the societal context:
We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the growth of the living
present. Law cannot stand still: it must change with the changing social
concepts and values . . . . Law must therefore constantly be on the move
adapting itself to the fast changing society and not lag behind.
See Nat’l Textile Workers’ Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan (1983) 1 S.C.C. 228, ¶ 9
(India) (Bhagwati, J.).
274. See P.K. Koul, WP(C) No. 15239/2004 ¶ 259 (“[T]he principles laid down in
this judgment would bind only a fact situation as in the present case or similar
circumstances when the State has been unable to protect the fundamental and basic
human rights of its citizens compelling them to be displaced from the place of their
residence and is not in a position to ensure their safety or security in case they return
to the place of their residence.”).
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contrast to the other slum clearance cases explored herein.
Unfortunately, this case, and this very comprehensive account of
human rights and the right to shelter, has not currently been cited by
any other judgment. And so, the cases on record, which continue to
inform recent decisions, remain the cases of illegality.275
CONCLUSION
This Article engages with the discourses of the political economy of
development and the concepts of modernity and neoliberalism
through the lens of the role of the judiciary in order to understand the
context in which recent cases regarding the legality of slum residences
have occurred.
The contextualization of these judgments shows the constitution
and reinforcement of norms of legitimacy and modernity in
development discourse, policy, and judicial opinions.
More
specifically, through this analysis the Article tries to show how, once
modernity is taken to mean a collection of orientations which, in the
context of urban development, includes neoliberalism, then the legal
narrowing of rights of the poor to their residences appears to be a
natural consequence. Just as the eras of socialism lent a certain lens
to how the poor were seen, the discrediting of those socialist policies
and the turn towards capitalism have had their own effects on the
characterization of the poor.
The judgments focused on here might have been different—in
rhetoric and in outcome—if the courts had had alternative narratives
of an inclusive form of development or capitalism on which they
could have relied.276 However, within the current orthodoxy, the hold
of neoliberalism and the attraction of capital on popular discourse,
policy, and the judiciary have meant that the claims of the middle
class are more likely than not to win with regards to urban space.
When claims of the urban poor do ‘win’ with regard to rehabilitation,
they are either provided for in a formal but not substantive way, or
they are seen as anomalies to the system of growth and

275. For example, cases such as Asharfi Lal v. Union of India, (2009) W.P.(C) 699–
712/2006 (India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/102546270/, continue
to uphold this line of cases. See also Milk Producers Ass’n v. State of Orissa, (2006) 3
S.C.C. 229 (India); Wazirpur Bartan Nirmata Sangh v. Union of India, (2003) 103
D.L.T. 654 (2002) (India); Friends Colony Residents Ass’n v. Lt. Governor of Delhi,
(2004) 114 D.L.T. 587 (India); Gaya Parshad v. N.D.M.C., (2006) 127 D.L.T. 123
(India).
276. Thank you to Nick Robinson for discussion on this idea.
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development—unfortunate accommodations that must be tolerated
before continuing to move full speed ‘ahead.’
Without an alternative, inclusive, economic agenda, the judicial
support for the political economic orthodoxy of neoliberal
development has come at a frenetic pace. In India’s quest to “be
made worthy” of entrance into the global economy, the corporate
sector has begun “to be seen to be the engine powering this journey
into the hypermodern.”277 The judiciary’s part in this seems to be to
support the engine of development and modernity by supporting what
is seen to be the path accepted by policymakers—corporate and
investment growth.
If an alternative existed in mainstream Indian policy discourse (or
if courts chose to go against mainstream discourse more often), the
judiciary might have had legitimate ways to acknowledge and respect
the poor and to include them as full urban citizens with rights. In that
event, judgments that included the rights of the poor would not have
been seen as a benevolence or charity; they would be seen in a
context where such rights furthered a political economic vision in
which the urban poor would have a role.
The task remains to craft alternative narratives to neoliberal
development and capitalism that do not fall prey to the same traps
that socialism did. The role of the judiciary and of the articulations of
values and legitimacy in their opinions are not to be underestimated
in the project of re-crafting. Through the designation of rights and
the framing of history, political-economy, and the humanity of the
people who come before it, the courts play a huge part in reinforcing
or shifting what is seen as legitimate—legitimate actions on the part
of the government, the middle class, and the poor; legitimate laws and
government responsibility; and, as specifically explored here,
legitimate uses of space and resources in urban areas.

277. See Aditya Nigam, Embedded Judiciary: Or the Judicial State of Exception?,
OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA
22, 33 (Mayur Suresh & Siddharth Narrain eds., 2014) (referencing Upendra Baxi).
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